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Abstract
The aim of this article is to provide a historical response to Michel Janssen’s
(2009) claim that the special theory of relativity establishes that relativistic
phenomena are purely kinematical in nature, and that the relativistic study
of such phenomena is completely independent of the dynamics of the systems
displaying such behavior. This response will be formulated through a histori-
cal discussion of one of Janssen’s cases, the experiments carried out by Walter
Kaufmann on the velocity-dependence of the electron’s mass. Through a dis-
cussion of the different responses formulated by early adherents of the princi-
ple of relativity (Albert Einstein, Max Planck, Hermann Minkowski and Max
von Laue) to these experiments, it will be argued that the historical devel-
opment of the special theory of relativity argues against Janssen’s historical
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presentation of the case, and that this raises questions about his general
philosophical claim. It will be shown, more specifically, that Planck and Ein-
stein developed a relativistic response to the Kaufmann experiments on the
basis of their study of the dynamics of radiation phenomena, and that this
response differed significantly from the response formulated by Minkowski
and Laue. In this way, it will be argued that there were, at the time, two
different approaches to the theory of relativity, which differed with respect
to its relation to theory, experiment, and history: Einstein’s and Planck’s
heuristic approach, and Minkowski’s and Laue’s normative approach. This
indicates that it is difficult to say, historically speaking, that the special the-
ory of relativity establishes the kinematical nature of particular phenomena.
Instead, it will be argued that the theory of relativity should not be seen as a
theory but rather as outlining an approach to the interpretation of physical
theories, and that the nature of particular scientific phenomena is something
that is open to scientific debate and dispute.
Keywords: Kaufmann experiments, velocity-dependence of mass, special
relativity, kinematics versus dynamics
1. Introduction
Recently, Michel Janssen (2009) has argued, by means of three historical
cases, that the special theory of relativity establishes that various phenom-
ena, previously thought to require an explanation in terms of the dynamics
of the system displaying the behaviour, can in fact be given an entirely kine-
matical explanation, and that this entails that the relativistic study of these
phenomena is completely independent of the system’s dynamics. One of these
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cases concerns Walter Kaufmann’s experiments on the velocity-dependence
of the electron’s mass. While Hendrik Lorentz and Max Abraham attempted
to account for Kaufmann’s results in terms of the dynamics of the electron,
special relativity shows, according to Janssen, that the phenomenon is inde-
pendent of the dynamics underlying the system displaying it, and that it is
rather a consequence of the relativistic space-time in which the system dis-
plays this behavior. Janssen argues for this claim, more specifically, by means
of three historical claims: (i) that Albert Einstein’s (1905a) derivation of the
relativistic equations describing the velocity-dependence of mass shows that
he saw that the phenomenon was purely kinematical; (ii) that the relativis-
tic account of the velocity-dependence of mass was mainly elaborated and
accepted on the basis of theoretical considerations; and (iii) that the work
by Max von Laue clearly shows the kinematical nature of the phenomenon
because it makes use of Hermann Minkowski’s space-time geometry, which
forms the natural interpretation of the theory of special relativity.
In this article, I will argue that the historical development of the theory of
special relativity argues against Janssen’s claims (i)-(iii). By means of a dis-
cussion of how different adherents of the principle of relativity (Einstein, Max
Planck, Minkowski and Laue) responded to the issues raised by Kaufmann’s
experiments, I will argue, in particular, for the following claims: (i) that both
Einstein and Planck did not consider the phenomenon to be purely kinemat-
ical in nature, and that dynamical considerations, based on their study of
radiation phenomena, did play an important role in the development of their
response to Kaufmann’s experiments; (ii) that besides theoretical consider-
ations, experimental and historiographical factors also played an important
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role in the establishment of a relativistic account of the experiments; and
(iii) that this shows that both Einstein and Planck adhered to a heuristic
approach to the theory of relativity that differed profoundly from what I will
call Minkowski’s normative approach, and that therefore, historically speak-
ing, we should not see the Minkowskian framework as necessarily offering the
natural interpretation of the theory of relativity. Through the elaboration of
these three points, I will then argue that Laue’s work does not completely ad-
dress the issues raised by Kaufmann’s experiments, but rather sidesteps them
in certain ways, because of its use of the Minkowskian approach. By con-
trasting the Minkowskian normative approach with the Einsteinian heuristic
approach, I will then conclude that it is difficult to claim that the theory
shows that the velocity-dependence of mass is kinematical in nature. The
historical discussion rather shows that such characterizations of the nature
of a phenomenon are dependent on a particular scientist’s aims and interests,
and are therefore open to scientific debate and dispute.
In order to achieve this, I will proceed as follows. I start, in section
2, with a short discussion of Janssen’s general philosophical claims and his
historical discussion of the Kaufmann experiments. After that, I will turn
to a discussion of the historical episode (section 3), in which I will focuson
Janssen’s historical claims (i)-(iii). In section 4, I will then elaborate some
concluding remarks.
2. Janssen’s Discussion of the Kaufmann Experiments
The following statement perfectly summarizes the essential novelty of
Einstein’s Special theory of Relativity (STR), according to Janssen (2009, p.
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26): “Einstein was the first to formulate clearly the new kinematical founda-
tion for all of physics inherent in Lorentz’s electron theory” (Stachel et al.,
1989, p. 253). The theory’s main accomplishment, on this reading, was that
it showed that relativistic phenomena such as time dilation and length con-
traction are purely kinematical. That a phenomenon is kinematical means,
on Janssen’s view, that “it is just an instance of some generic feature of the
world, in this case instances of default spatio-temporal behavior” (2009, p.
27). Janssen elaborates this claim by means of a distinction between two
kinds of kinematical phenomena: phenomena are kinematical in the broad
sense if they are “independent of the specifics of the dynamics”; they are
kinematical in the narrow sense if they are “an example of standard spatio-
temporal behavior” (2009, p. 28). STR now shows that certain phenomena
are kinematical in both senses, which entails that nothing more is to be
learned from them: “[u]nless one challenges the classification of the phe-
nomenon as kinematical in this sense – and the universality of the relevant
feature will militate strongly against that – there is nothing more to learn
from that particular phenomenon, neither about the specific system in which
it occurs nor about the generic feature it instantiates” (Janssen, 2009, p. 27;
original emphasis).
Janssen’s argument for this claim consists of three particular historical
episodes in which STR established the kinematical nature of particular phe-
nomena previously thought to require a dynamical account2: refraction in
2These are the specific examples that Janssen presents as arguments for his general
claim. His reason for discussing these is that they have not received the philosophical
attention they deserve (Janssen, 2009, p. 29) in comparison with e.g. the Michelson-Morley
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moving media and the Fresnel drag coefficient (2009, p. 29 – 32); the Kauf-
mann experiments and the velocity-dependence of mass (2009, p. 32 – 41);
and the Trouton-Noble experiment (2009, p. 41 – 47). Each of these cases
shows, according to Janssen, how STR explains these phenomena “by identi-
fying the kinematical nature (rather than the cause)3 of the relevant phenom-
ena” (2009, p. 28). As such, the best way to clarify and illustrate Janssen’s
general claim is through a historical and philosophical discussion of one of
these cases, namely the Kaufmann episode. The main reason for discussing
this episode is that, as Janssen points out, it has not yet received the philo-
sophical attention it deserves, especially since the Kaufmann experiments
were central to the debate in the scientific community at the time.4 More-
over, while they were taken by Poincare´, Lorentz and others to pose serious
issues for the theory of relativity at the time (see (Miller, 1981, p. 334 –
335) and (Staley, 2008, chapters 6 and 7)), relatively few has been written
about the development of a relativistic response. Finally, the discussion of
historical episode suggests an interesting point, which is that the elaboration
of a relativistic theory really only started in the years after the publication
experiment, which, he claims, also backs up his claim (Janssen, 2009, p. 48).
3Such causal interpretations of STR, as offered for example by Harvey Brown in his
(2005) book, are the main foil of Janssen’s argument. In short, Brown’s dynamical account
of special relativity comes down to the claim that the relativistic phenomena should not be
accounted for in terms space-time geometry, but rather in terms of the dynamics underlying
these phenomena.
4As we will see, Kaufmann was the first to discuss Einstein’s (1905a) relativity article,
and it was mainly in the context of the issues raised by the experiments that Einstein’s
work was elaborated, discussed and criticized (Staley, 2008, p. 242 – 243).
6
of Einstein’s (1905a). The main reason for discussing Janssen’s philosophical
claim from a historical perspective is that he himself also favours this ap-
proach: he describes his work as “a brand of philosophy of physics informed
by (conceptual) history of physics” (2009, p. 28).5
Pre-relativistic treatments of the Kaufmann experiments. Between 1901 and
1906, Walter Kaufmann carried out a series of experimental measurements
of the exact dependence of the electron’s mass on its velocity, with the goal
to provide insight into the electron’s constitution. Such a dependence was
first hinted at by J. J. Thomson, who claimed that if the electron moves
through its own electromagnetic field, it should experience a decrease in ve-
locity as if it had gained mass (Staley, 2008, p. 219) (Miller, 1981, p. 46).
While Thomson presented this as merely a mathematical hypothesis, the
idea gained physical meaning a few years later. The first to elaborate the
physical content of this dependence was H. A. Lorentz (1899). In the first
part of this article Lorentz presents a new, simplified, formulation of the
transformation equations for coordinates and electric and magnetic fields he
had proposed in his Versuch (1895). In the second part, he then elaborates
some of the physical consequences of the deformation hypothesis he had pre-
sented earlier in response to the result of the Michelson-Morley experiment,
by considering its implications for a particular example, i.e. an oscillating
electron. Determining the specific transformation equations for the forces
and accelerations involved in such a system then leads him to suggest that
5Besides his (2009), Janssen also has an extensive article on this case with Matthew
Mecklenburg (2006).
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the mass of an electron in motion depends on its velocity. Janssen formulates
Lorentz’s hypothesis as follows:6
It follows that the electron’s oscillation in the moving frame only sat-
isfies Newton’s second law if its mass depends on its velocity and if its
‘longitudinal mass (m‖), the inertia for acceleration in the direction
of motion, differs from its ‘transverse mass’ (m⊥), the inertia for ac-
celeration perpendicular to the direction of motion. More specifically,
m‖ and m⊥ should satisfy (Lorentz (1899, p. 442); Lorentz (1904, p.
27))
m‖ = lγ3m′,m⊥ = lγm′. (1)
Both m‖ and m⊥ increase dramatically as the velocity of the electron
approaches the velocity of light. (Janssen, 2009, p. 33)
Here, l denotes an unspecified scale factor, γ = 1/
√
1− (v/c)2, and m′ refers
to the material system’s rest mass. Lorentz’s electron-theory (1904), which
models the electron as“a small spherical surface charge distribution, which
undergoes a microscopic version of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction when
it is set in motion with respect to the ether”, later brought him to put
l = 1 (Janssen, 2009, p. 34).7 At around the same time, however, a different
formula for the electron’s velocity-dependent mass was also proposed by Max
Abraham (1902; 1903; 1904; 1905). His account, which modeled the electron
6See Janssen and Mecklenburg (2006, p. 75 – 80) for a more extensive discussion of
how Lorentz arrives at this claim.
7In this way, Janssen (2009, p. 32) points out, Lorentz thus arrived at the same equa-
tions as STR, even though Einstein obtained them through a different route, as we will
see later.
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as “a rigid spherical surface charge distribution [which] retains its shape
regardless of its state of motion”, was in line with his commitment to the
electromagnetic program,8 since it entailed a complete dependence of the
electron’s mass on its motion through its self-field, and as such suggested an
electromagnetic account of matter (Janssen, 2009, p. 33 – 34).The difference
between Lorentz’s and Abraham’s equations for the electron’s longitudinal
and transverse mass thus stemmed from their different electron-models – rigid
versus deformable – which in turn, as Janssen (2009, p. 34) points out, derived
from their different concerns: Lorentz’s electron was deformable because he
wanted his theory to account for the material contraction of the material
set-up used in the Michelson-Morley experiment;9 Abraham’s electron was
8In very general terms, the electromagnetic view of nature was an approach to physical
theorizing that attempted to reduce the whole of physics to interactions in the electromag-
netic ether obeying the Maxwell equations. Its most well-known adherents were Wilhelm
Wien, who wrote a kind of manifesto (1900), and Abraham (see e.g. his (1905, p. 143 –
147) handbook). Recent years have seen the emergence of a debate about the historical
meaning of this movement/program, and I therefore refer the reader to those articles for
a more elaborate and informed discussion of the electromagnetic view, as well as for an
overview of the existing literature on the subject: see the article by Suman Seth (2004)
which drew a reply from Shaul Katzir (2005), to which Seth again replied (2005). Chapter
24 of Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach ’s history of nineteenth-century the-
oretical physics (1990, p. 211 – 253) offers a thorough discussion of the electromagnetic
program and its relations to the main other world views at the time.
9To account for the null result of Michelson and Morley’s experiments, Lorentz claimed
that the length of the interferometer’s arms deformed because of their motion through the
ether. To explain how this occured, Lorentz hypothesized that the electrons constitut-
ing the material set-up were subject to the same deformation as the optical interference
patterns measured in the experiment (Janssen&Mecklenburg, 2006, p. 75 – 79) (Janssen,
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rigid because he wanted his theory to be in line with the electromagnetic
program.
In this way, the velocity-dependence of the electron’s mass offered the
possibility to investigate the constitution of the electron: was it rigid or
deformable? To investigate this question, Kaufmann carried out a series of
experiments (1901a; 1902; 1903; 1906) in which he investigated the charge-to-
mass ratio of the electrons constituting high-velocity Becquerel rays (which
later became known as β-rays).10 He did this by passing these rays, emitted
by a piece of radium bromide, through a diaphragm in a lead barrier, onto
a photographic plate, all within a flask that was evacuated of air. When
no electric or magnetic fields were applied, the electrons that constituted the
rays would form a simple dot on the plate. The application of a magnetic field
would lead to the image of a straight line, whereas the application of both
an electric and a magnetic field would give rise to a curved line. Because of
the variation of the velocity of the electrons, this curvature could be taken to
represent the velocity-dependence of the electron’s charge-to-mass ratio: the
higher the electron’s velocity, the more it would be deflected by the applied
fields. At the time, electrodynamics was taken to imply that an electron’s
2009, p. 32).
10Unfortunately, I cannot go much into the details of the way in which Kaufmann set
up and ran his experiments. James T. Cushing (1981), Arthur Miller (1981, p. 47 – 54;
61 – 67; 226 – 232), Giora Hon (1995) and Richard Staley (2008, p. 219 – 243) all offer
extensive discussions of Kaufmann’s experimental set-up and his conceptual apparatus.
Regarding the material aspects of Kaufmann’s experiments specifically, I refer the reader
to chapter six of Staley’s (2008) book on Einstein’s generation and the origins of the
relativity revolution.
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charge remains stable with changing velocity (Cushing, 1981, p. 1138). Given
the recent experimental determinations of the electron’s charge-to-mass ratio
by Thomson and Pieter Zeeman, Kaufmann could thus infer a precise formula
for the velocity-dependence of the electron’s mass from the precise curvature
of the curve on the photographic plate.
The first round of experiments showed a definite dependence of the elec-
tron’s mass on its velocity (Kaufmann, 1901a, p. 155). Abraham (1902, p.
21) soon pointed out, however, that Kaufmann’s derivation of his results only
allowed him to make that claim for the electron’s longitudinal mass m‖, but
not for what was actually at stake, namely its transverse mass m⊥.11 This
was a consequence of Kaufmann’s reliance on a defective electron-model,
proposed by G. F. C. Searle (1897). Abraham therefore developed an al-
ternative model of the electron, i.e. his rigid spherical charge. This in turn
prompted Kaufmann to reanalyse his earlier data, and to conduct a new
series of experiments. These showed a very close fit with Abraham’s predic-
tions, which led Kaufmann to the conclusion that the electron’s mass is of a
purely electromagnetic nature (Kaufmann, 1902, p. 295).
These results prompted Lorentz to elaborate a purely electromagnetic
account of the electron as well, which led him to put l = 1 in the equa-
tions (1) for the electron’s velocity-dependence of mass (1904, p. 24 – 31).
Abraham ((1904, p. 578); (1905, p. 204 – 205)) soon pointed out, however,
11In fact, it was in this context that the distinction between longitudinal and transverse
mass was made for the first time, by Abraham in his (1902) article. Before, most physicists
spoke in more general terms about the distinction between a body’s true (mechanical)
mass, and its apparent (electrodynamical) mass (Staley, 2008, p. 229 – 230).
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that Lorentz’s electron, in its purely electromagnetic form, possibly faced
stability-issues: its m‖ derived from its electromagnetic momentum differs
from its m‖ derived from its electromagnetic energy by a factor 4/3, which
entailed that Lorentz had to give up the fully electromagnetic nature of his
electron: it required “an extra, nonelectromagnetic force in order to retain
equilibrium, for without it the deformable electron could explode owing to
the repulsive forces between the constituents of its charge” (Staley, 2008, p.
231).12. Moreover, in (1903), Abraham had shown that force-free inertial
motion, i.e. “inertial motion that could be maintained without any exter-
nal forces balancing the electron’s self-forces”, was not guaranteed unless
the electron’s velocity and momentum were collinear (Miller, 1981, p. 57).
This was the case, he showed, when “the charge’s shape is symmetric about
axes perpendicular to its direction of motion” (Miller, 1981, p. 58). For
Abraham’s rigid spherical charge, this was of course no problem. When one
conceived the electron as a rigid ellipsoidal charge distribution, this entailed
that force-free inertial motion was only possible when moving in the direc-
tion of its major axis. Finally, for Lorentz’s deformable electron, it was not
clear how an additional non-electromagnetic force, required for the cohesion
of Lorentz’s deformable electron, would ensure that force-free inertial motion
was possible in all directions (Miller, 1981, p. 76). The solution was presented
by Poincare´ ((1905, p. 578); (1906, p. 130)): it was only by assuming that
the electron experiences a negative pressure from the ether that Lorentz’s
equations for the electron’s longitudinal and transverse mass (with l = 1)
12Miller offers a very extensive discussion of this issue in chapter 1 of his (1981) book,
as do Stanley Goldberg (1970) and Janssen & Mecklenburg (2006, p. 85 – 88).
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could be retained (Janssen, 2009, p. 35).
Because Abraham’s and Lorentz’s models led to different predictions for
the velocity-dependence of mass, Kaufmann (1906) decided to run another
series of experiments, which were carried out with enormous attention to
detail and accuracy (Staley, 2008, p. 236 – 241). Abraham’s and Lorentz’s
were not the only theories tested, however. Another electron model that was
considered was one proposed by Alfred Bucherer (1904). Bucherer’s electron
was deformable, just as Lorentz’s, but the way in which it deformed in mo-
tion differed in such a way that its volume remained constant, in contrast
to Lorentz’s (Janssen&Mecklenburg, 2006, p. 80 – 81). The fourth account
considered by Kaufmann was Einstein’s, who in his (1905a, p. 919) article on
the principle of relativity had also obtained equations for the electron’s longi-
tudinal and transverse mass that were equivalent to Lorentz’s, as Kaufmann
pointed out (1906, p. 491 – 492). In this way, the experiments promised
not only a decision between different electron models, but also between dif-
ferent approaches to the foundations of physics: whereas Abraham’s elec-
tromagnetic electron represented the electromagnetic world view, Einstein’s
and Lorentz’s represented an approach that attempted to base the whole of
physics on the principle of relativity (Kaufmann, 1906, p. 493).13
13Lorentz’s work on the electron was seen as relativistic for two reasons: first, because it
required non-electromagnetic forces to ensure its stability, it violated the electromagnetic
program’s aim to reduce the whole of physics to the laws of electrodynamics; and second,
because his primary aim was to account for the null result of the Michelson-Morley exper-
iment, i.e. the impossibility to detect any motion of the earth with respect to the ether
(Janssen, 2009, p. 34). Bucherer’s electron seems to escape this classification, but given
that it didn’t really play a role of importance in the Kaufmann episode, it will not be
13
Relativistic treatment of the Kaufmann experiments. What sets Einstein apart
from the rest, however, is that he does not rely on any specific electron model.
For the time being, he rather takes the electron to be just a material point
particle endowed with a certain electric charge. As such, Einstein leaves open
the question of the electron’s actual physical constitution (Einstein, 1905a,
p. 917). Einstein rather proceeds on the basis of the principle of relativity
and the light principle (1905a, p. 895):14
(PoR) The laws governing the changes of state of any physical system do not depend
on which one of two coordinate systems in uniform translational motion
relative to each other these changes are referred to.
(LP) Each ray of light moves in the coordinate system “at rest” with the definite
velocity V independent of whether this ray of light is emitted by a body at
rest or in motion.
These principles allow Einstein to obtain transformation equations for the
times, locations and electric and magnetic fields that ensure that the laws
of mechanics, electrodynamics and optics obey the principle of relativity. To
obtain equations for the velocity-dependence of mass, Einstein then applies
the relativistic coordinate transformations to the equations of motion for
such an electron. By making use of Newton’s force law, he then obtains
expressions for the electron’s longitudinal and transverse mass, which are
later identified with Lorentz’s equations (1) with l = 1 because of symmetry-
discussed further.
14All quotes by Einstein are taken from Anna Beck and Peter Havas’s English Transla-
tion Supplement of the second volume of the Einstein Papers (1989).
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considerations.1516 A second aspect that sets Einstein apart is that his deriva-
tion is not even particularly concerned with the electron as such: the obtained
equations apply not just to the electron in motion, but to all material bodies
in general, since for the purpose of the derivation he takes the electron to be
merely a material point endowed with an arbitrarily small charge (1905a, p.
920).
That Einstein proceeds in this way now shows, according to Janssen, that
he correctly grasped that the phenomenon is kinematical in the broad sense of
15In fact, in his original article Einstein arrived at equations that differed slightly from
Lorentz’s, because he did not use a relativistic force-law, expressed in terms of momentum
and conservation of energy, but rather the Newtonian force law, expressed in terms of mass
and acceleration. This mistake was first picked up and corrected by Kaufmann (1906, p.
530 – 531) and corrected by Max Planck (1906a). Einstein himself first employed this
new force law in his (1907c) review article on the theory of relativity. This is a bit of an
ironic oversight, since Einstein himself was quite aware of the importance of the force-law
employed in this context: right after his presentation of the mass-equations he in fact
states that, with another definition of force, one would have arrived at different results,
which entails that one has to be careful here (1905a, p. 919).
16On the basis of his two principles, Einstein arrives at transformation equations relating
two reference frames in relative motion, K and k, which moves with a velocity v with
respect to K. These expressions, however, contain an expression φ, a function of the
velocity v that is at that point in the derivation unknown. To clarify the meaning of this
unknown term, Einstein then introduces a third reference frame moving with velocity −v
with respect to the frame k. This shows him that φ(v)φ(−v) = 1. Reflecting on the length
of a rod, at rest in k and thus in motion with respect to K, then shows him that the length
of the rod in K is l/φ(v). Reasons of symmetry, he then claims, show us that the length
of the rod does not change when v is replaced by −v, which leads him to φ(v) = φ(−v),
which entails that φ(v) = 1 (Einstein, 1905a, p. 900 – 902).
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being independent of the dynamics, and that dynamical investigations were
“misguided[:] [a]s Einstein (1905a, §10) first suggested, Eq. (1) for l = 1
simply gives the generic velocity-dependence of mass in a new relativistic
mechanics. These relations provide no insight whatsoever into the origin of
the electron’s mass” (2009, p. 33). This is what Janssen takes to be the
radical novelty of Einstein’s STR.
As Janssen also points out, however, Einstein’s account was not generally
seen in this way at the time. For when Kaufmann, for example, presented the
results of his latest series of experiments, he equated Einstein’s account with
Lorentz’s dynamical electron theory, because their predictions were formally
equivalent (see footnote 15) and because they had the same concern, i.e. to
ensure that their theories obey the principle of relativity (Janssen, 2009, p.
34).17 Moreover, the results of these experiments were devastating for the
Lorentz-Einstein equation: it came out worst of the three models considered
in all three different analyses of his measurements that were carried out by
Kaufmann.18 This led Kaufmann to the conclusion that it was definitively
17Kaufmann was not the only one who equated Einstein’s and Lorentz’s theories. Ein-
stein himself, for example, also spoke about the theory of Lorentz and Einstein (1906c,
p. 586), and Planck (1906b, p. 756) spoke about the Einstein-Lorentz theory. See Staley
(2008, p. 301 – 309) for a discussion of the different ways in which many other scientists
at the time also grouped Einstein together with Lorentz.
18Miller (1981, p. 230 – 231) and Hon (1995) offer an extensive discussion of Kaufmann’s
data-procedure. As Hon points out, “Kaufmann determined several constants of the curve
that had been recorded on the photographic plate; he compared these constants with the
corresponding constants obtained from the various theories” (1995, p. 190). In short,
Kaufmann evaluated the different theories with respect to how their predictions differed
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shown that the attempt to base the whole of physics on the principle of
relativity had failed (1906, p. 534).
According to Janssen, later experiments carried out by Bucherer (1908)
produced results in favor of the Einstein-Lorentz equation, and these together
with other experiments led to a broad consensus, according to Janssen (2009,
p. 35), that the data were in fact closer to the Lorentz-Einstein prediction
than to Abraham’s. The central lesson to be learnt here for Janssen, however,
is that we should not put too much weight on these experimental attempts
to probe the velocity-dependence of mass, since most scientists “all paid
lip service to the importance of the experiments, especially when the data
seemed to favor their own theories [. . . ], but it is not clear how seriously they
really took them. I suspect that theoretical considerations eventually led to
the acceptance of the Lorentz-Einstein formula” (2009, p. 35). We should not
pay too much attention to the experimental results, according to Janssen,
because STR shows, as Einstein already saw in 1905, that the idea to acquire
insight into the constitution of the electron by investigating the velocity-
dependence of mass is “misguided” (2009, p. 33) and an “illusion” (2009, p.
35), since the phenomenon arises for all kinds of physical systems, not just
for electrons. And while Einstein’s insight that the phenomenon is purely
kinematical could in 1905 still be seen as merely a theoretical suggestion,
Max von Laue’s continuum mechanics (1911a; 1911b)19 formulation of the
from the measured (a) curvature formed by the electrons on the photographic plate, (b)
the charge-to-mass ratio of the electron’s constituting Becquerel rays, and (c) the precise
deflection of the electrons by the electromagnetic field in the y-direction.
19See (Janssen&Mecklenburg, 2006, p. 68 – 71; 99 – 105) and (Janssen, 2009, p. 35 –
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theory definitely established this claim(2009, p. 35). This becomes clear once
we derive the equations (1) for l = 1 in this framework:
This derivation of these relations shows how generic they are. They
give the velocity-dependence of the mass of any closed system de-
scribed by Lorentz-invariant laws.20 Other than that, they reveal
nothing about the system. It is because the electron model of Lorentz
and Poincare´ is closed and Lorentz invariant that their contractile
electron obeys these relations; it is because Abraham’s model is not
Lorentz invariant that his rigid electron does not. (Janssen, 2009, p.
36)
In this way, STR establishes that the velocity-dependence of mass is a purely
kinematical phenomenon, both in the broad and in the narrow sense. That
the phenomenon is kinematical in the broad sense follows from the fact that
the theory shows the equations to be generic: the phenomenon arises for any
material system in motion and is thus independent of the specifics of the
dynamics of the system displaying the behaviour, as Einstein, according to
Janssen, already saw in (1905a), as we have seen on page 14.21
37) for an extensive discussion of Laue’s formulation of special relativity.
20For Janssen’s definition of a closed system, see (2009, p. 35).
21It is important to stress here that this does not mean that Janssen claims that special
relativity says all there is to say about mass tout court. As Janssen points out, if one
wants to account for the origin of the rest mass m′ of a particular system, one will of course
have to rely on detailed dynamical considerations. Special relativity shows, however, that
the velocity-dependence of mass of such a system in motion arises independently of such
considerations, and as such the theory shows, according to Janssen, that the phenomenon
is kinematical in the broad sense (Janssen, 2009, p. 38).
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The theory also shows that the phenomenon is kinematical in the nar-
row sense of exemplifying standard spatio-temporal behavior, according to
Janssen. It does this by means of its Minkowskian space-time geometry,
in which the Lorentz transformations which follow from the theory’s pos-
tulates find what Janssen describes as their “natural interpretation” (2009,
p. 39). What he means by this is that the theory tells us that whatever
the fundamental laws of physics will be, their space-time geometry will be
Minkowskian, or equivalently, the laws will be invariant under the Lorentz
transformations. A phenomenon is then considered to be kinematical in the
narrow sense if the system’s behavior is a straightforward consequence of
the Lorentz invariance of the laws that govern this behavior. We then say
that the system exemplifies standard spatio-temporal behavior: the system’s
behavior reflects the geometry of Minkowski space-time because it is a con-
sequence of the Lorentz invariance of whatever physical laws that actually
govern this behavior. That the velocity-dependence of the electron’s mass
exemplifies such standard spatio-temporal behavior shows itself, according to
Janssen, in the way in which Laue derives the equations 1 with l = 1 (2009,
p. 40).22
22Janssen himself points out that Laue relies not only on the transformation equations
for length and time, but also on the one for force, and that as such, one could claim
that more is involved in the relativistic account of the phenomenon than purely kinemat-
ical considerations. According to Janssen, however, this is not correct, since the theory’s
central concepts reflect the Minkowskian space-time structure: “[r]elativistic continuum
mechanics is tailored to the structure of Minkowski space-time. The behavior of its gen-
eral concepts [. . . ], under Lorentz transformations reflects this space-time structure. So
even though the transformation law for mass cannot be established without reference to
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In this way, Janssen takes the Kaufmann episode to provide historical
evidence for his more general claim that special relativity reveals the kine-
matical nature of the relativistic behavior of systems in motion: it is because
the motion of these systems takes place in a space-time characterized in terms
of Minkowskian geometry that they display this behavior, and that we need
to describe this behavior in terms of Lorentz-invariant laws. In this way, he
concludes, it becomes “clear that the relevant features of the moving sys-
tem do not call for a dynamical explanation in special relativity[:] [t]hey are
kinematical in the sense that the moving system is just exhibiting default
spatio-temporal behavior” (Janssen, 2009, p. 48).
3. The Principle of Relativity and the Kaufmann Experiments
In what follows I will discuss the way in which some of the proponents
of the principle of relativity responded to the Kaufmann experiments and
the issues related to it. My aim with this is to argue against the historical
narrative underlying Janssen’s general claim that the theory of special relativ-
ity, already in Einstein’s (1905a) formulation, established that the velocity-
dependence of mass is a kinematical phenomenon and that the relativistic
study of this phenomenon is completely independent of the dynamics of the
systems displaying such behaviour. I will show, more specifically, that such
a conceptualization of the phenomenon is a consequence not so much of Ein-
stein’s (or Planck’s) formulation of STR, but rather of Hermann Minkowski’s
re-interpretation of it. As such, the central consequence of my argument here
concepts over and above spatio-temporal ones, the velocity-dependence of mass is still
kinematical, even in the narrow sense” (2009, p. 40).
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will be that we need to draw a significant distinction between what I will call
Einstein’s heuristic approach to the theory of relativity, and Minkowski’s
normative approach.23
In short, this distinction comes down to the following. On the heuris-
tic approach, the principles of the theory of relativity primarily function as
instruments that can help in the construction of relativistic theories con-
cerning specific phenomena: this is done by applying the relativistic time-
and length-transformations, which incorporate the two principles, to the laws
that govern these specific phenomena. In themselves, however, these prin-
ciples only suggest, but do not provide these theories yet: for this, a study
of the dynamics of the systems underlying these phenomena is also required.
On this heuristic approach, the range of the validity of the theory’s prin-
ciples is still an open question, and this can be tested experimentally. As
a consequence of this, the principles can only be employed in a piecemeal
way, by applying them to specific cases, since the principles do not provide
a relativistic world view.
On the normative approach, on the other hand, the principles of the
theory of relativity primarily function as norms for all existing and future
23The central aim of this historical discussion is thus to trace how the meaning of the
principles of the theory of relativity, and the way in which they were used, changed over
time in the early development of the theory. I will therefore refrain from giving a general
definition of what I take to be these principles, since it is the differences between the
different formulations that I am interested in. When discussing the views of particular
authors, I have attempted, however, to clarify whether they are talking about the principle
of relativity, the principles of the theory of relativity, or the theory and its consequences.
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue.
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theories: they enable scientists to evaluate whether a theory adheres to the
principles by checking whether the theory’s laws guarantee invariance of the
space-time interval with respect to the Lorentz group, and if not, it tells them
how to correct the theory. On this approach, the theory’s principles have
exceptionless validity, and because of their formulation they are prior to any
physical experience: they do not allow for a direct way to test experimentally
whether the world we live in abides by these principles.24
To argue for this, I will focus on three central points of Janssen’s historical
argument for his general philosophical claim: (i) his assertion that Einstein
already in 1905 saw the phenomenon’s kinematical nature (Janssen, 2009, p.
33); (ii) his claim that it was mainly theoretical considerations that led to
the acceptance of the Lorentz-Einstein equation (2009, p. 35); and (iii) his
characterization of Minkowski’s geometry as offering a natural interpretation
of the theory (2009, p. 39). In this way, it will become clear that the precise
interpretation of STR still needed to be elaborated after Einstein’s (1905a)
article, and that it is therefore difficult, from a historical-philosophical point
of view, to speak about the theory establishing the kinematical nature of
certain phenomena, as Janssen does.25
24As these descriptions indicate, the heuristic and the normative approach are not com-
plete opposites: for both, the theory’s principles can provide indications for future research.
The main difference, however, is in what the adherents of the approaches prioritize in their
use of the principles, and in their epistemological characterization of the principles: on
the heuristic approach, they are open-ended, experimentally testable and the range of
their validity is an open question; on the normative approach, on the other hand, they are
universal, they have exceptionless validity, and they are prior to physical experience.
25Of course, this historical claim in itself is perfectly well be compatible with Janssen’s
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3.1. Einstein and Ehrenfest
Ehrenfest and the deformable electron. My starting point for this will be an
issue raised by Paul Ehrenfest (1907) concerning the relativistic treatment of
the electron to which Einstein replied in an equally short note (1907a). The
question raised by Ehrenfest concerns the same issue as Abraham had raised
earlier for Lorentz’s theory: the stability of the electron (see page 11). Abra-
ham had shown, more specifically, that for a rigid ellipsoidal electron force-
free26 inertial motion was not possible in all directions, but only in the direc-
tion of its major axis. This entailed that it was unclear how force-free inertial
motion was possible for a deformable charge distribution. Given that Ein-
stein’s theory forms what Ehrenfest calls a “closed system”27 that in essence
more general philosophical claim about how the special theory of relativity should be
interpreted: even though dynamical studies played a role in the historical development of
the theory, the theory should in fact be interpreted as being concerned with the kinematical
nature of the relativistic phenomena. I would have no problem with this response to the
historical work presented here. Given, however, that Janssen explicitly states that his
approach to issues in the philosophy of physics is based on historical considerations (see
page 7), we can and should inquire into what the implications of the historical details
could be for the more general philosophical issues. I would like to thank an anonymous
reviewer for pressing me on this issue.
26Force-free here means, as we have seen on page 11, that the inertial motion could be
maintained “without any external forces balancing the electron’s self-forces” (Miller, 1981,
p. 57).
27Ehrenfest does not state explicitly what he means by this claim. He does specify,
however, that this means that the theory should be able to provide, in a completely
deductive way, an answer to his question. In general, Ehrenfest thus seems to see the theory
of relativity as a theory that, with regards to a specific domain (here electrodynamics),
should be able to account for all phenomena belonging to this domain.
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offers a reformulation of the “Lorentzsche Relativita¨ts-Elektrodynamik”,28 it
should be possible, according to Ehrenfest, to deduce an answer from the
theory to Abraham’s issue, formulated in the following terms: let us assume,
with Einstein, that we have a deformable electron, to which we do not as-
cribe any particular form at rest;29 the question then is: is force-free inertial
motion possible in any direction for such a deformable electron? (Ehrenfest,
1907, p. 204 – 205).
The issue raised by Ehrenfest, as he himself points out, exactly concerns
what is at stake in the Kaufmann experiments: the dynamics of the electron.
Regarding this issue, Ehrenfest then points out that the theory of relativity as
a closed system can provide two different answers in its current formulation,
both of which are equally problematic. If it tells us that such motion is not
possible in all directions for the deformable electron, then a new hypothesis
should be added to the theory that explicitly excludes the existence of such
electrons, for otherwise it would be possible to detect absolute rest. If it is
28Ehrenfest thus describes Einstein’s theory of relativity as an electrodynamical the-
ory, primarily a reformulation of Lorentz’s electrodynamics. Ehrenfest refers here not to
Einstein’s original STR-article (1905a), but rather to the short paper (1905b) which con-
tains Einstein’s derivation of the energy-mass equivalence. We should not see Ehrenfest’s
description of the theory as an electrodynamical one as a case of bad interpretation of
the theory: Einstein himself described his derivation of the energy-mass equivalence as a
very interesting consequence of what he calls his (1905a) electrodynamical investigations
(1905b, p. 639).
29Ehrenfest refers here to a statement made by Planck (1906a, p. 137), that his rela-
tivistic dynamics allows us to obtain a precise determination of the dependency of inertia
(“Tra¨gheit”) on velocity without the need to specify the form of the electron.
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possible, then it should be shown how this follows from the theory without
introducing a completely new axiom (Ehrenfest, 1907, p. 205). What this
shows is that, at the time, Kaufmann’s experiments were taken to pose the
dynamics of the electron as an issue to which electrodynamical theories had
to provide an answer. Moreover, this issue not only concerned theories of the
electron such as e.g. Lorentz’s, but equally well Einstein’s theory of relativity.
Even given its new, principled formulation, the electron was still taken to
raise issues for the theory. As Staley puts it: “Ehrenfest’s question shows
him taking the epistemological demands of relativity seriously, holding the
theory to its own standards” (2008, p. 264).30
Einstein’s response to Ehrenfest. Einstein’s (1907a; 1907b) response to Ehren-
fest’s note now shows that he took the dynamics of the electron to pose an
actual issue to which the theory of relativity had to provide an answer. In
his short direct reply to Ehrenfest, he sketches how the theory could provide
a response to this issue. He starts by stating that the principle of relativity
and the light postulate should not be taken as forming a closed system, or
30Staley himself does not specify which epistemological demands he has in mind. Given
the way in which Ehrenfest formulates his question, we can infer, however, that he took
the following elements to be significant epistemological characteristics of the way in which
Einstein formulated his theory: that Ehrenfest asks how the theory can answer his question
without introducing new axioms shows that he recognized the importance of principles in
Einstein’s formulation of the theory; Ehrenfest also saw that the theory’s most important
point was the exclusion of the detection of absolute rest; and that he specifies that the issue
arises independently of the electron’s precise form shows that he saw what was peculiar
about Einstein’s relativistic approach to the electron, which did not involve a specific
electron model.
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even as a system at all. They should rather be seen as offering merely a
heuristic instrument, which in itself only makes claims about the physical
behaviour of rigid bodies, clocks and light signals, i.e. the physical entities
and processes employed to carry out measurements of lengths and times in
inertial frames of reference.31 The theory only leads to statements about
other physical systems if these principles are applied to the laws of physics,
in which case they can lead us to previously unknown relations between these
laws. The theory’s principles in themselves, however, do not lead us to what
Einstein calls “additional statements” besides those concerning rods, clocks
and light signals (Einstein, 1907a, p. 206).
Einstein then sketches how such a heuristic use of the principles consti-
tuting the theory works, by showing how it allows one to obtain a relativistic
theory of the electron’s motion: by applying the relativistic time- and length-
transformations to the Maxwell equations for empty space, one can obtain
transformation equations for electric and magnetic forces; employing these,
together with the time- and length-transformations, then leads one to the
laws of motion for the electron. What is important here, is that the princi-
ples, in their current formulation, should not be seen as forming any kind of
closed system which already contains, in a deductive way, answers to ques-
tions concerning the electron itself: the principles only provide instruments
31Janssen dismisses this reading of the theory, because he takes it to be an idiosyncratic
reading stemming from Einstein’s operationalist preferences at the time; the theory is
in fact, according to Janssen (2009, p. 28), really concerned with the default spatio-
temporal behavior of all physical systems, which, he claims, becomes especially clear in
the Minkowskian formulation of special relativity.
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for the formulation of theories that could address such questions.
Einstein does not stop here, however. In the second part, he provides
a sketch of how one could obtain a deductive answer to Ehrenfest’s issue
regarding the constitution of the electron. He starts by pointing out that the
electromagnetic program assumes that the electron forms a rigid structure
over which electricity is distributed, but that the laws governing the motion
of such a structure are not deducible from electrodynamics on its own. This
entails that a deductive answer to the issue of the electron’s dynamics can
only be formulated when one possesses a sufficiently accurate dynamics of the
rigid body. However, from a relativistic point of view, Einstein then points
out, such a theory has not been obtained yet:
If the theory of relativity is correct, we are still far from the latter
goal [i.e. a dynamics of the rigid body]. For the time being, we only
have the kinematics of parallel translation and an expression for the
kinetic energy of a body in parallel translation, provided the latter
does not interact with other bodies; for the rest, both the dynamics
and the kinematics of a rigid body have at present to be considered
as unknown. (Einstein, 1907a, p. 207 – 208)
What this indicates is that, according to Einstein, neither an electromag-
netic approach, nor a relativistic one, could address Ehrenfest’s issue in a
completely satisfying way at the time, since neither could provide, on its
own, a sufficiently accurate dynamics of the rigid body. What is equally
important here, however, is that Einstein states that the theory of relativity
could not answer this question as of yet (“noch weit entfernt”), which sug-
gests that he saw Ehrenfest’s issue as one that needed to be addressed. If
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that is the case, we have an indication that, contra Janssen’s claim, Einstein
did not consider his (1905a) treatment of the velocity-dependence of mass to
be the final, kinematical word on the issue. In what follows, I will argue that
this is indeed the case, and that this suggested to Einstein that addressing
this issue required a relativistic study of the dynamics underlying systems
displaying the phenomenon.
Einstein and Relativistic Dynamics. Evidence for this can be found in an-
other article by Einstein from this period (1907b), which concerns the inertia
of energy.32 Einstein’s starting point here is the result obtained in his (1905b)
article to which Ehrenfest responds, i.e. that the principles of the theory rel-
ativity in combination with the Maxwell equations entail that the inertia of a
body changes in a determinate way with its energy content (Einstein, 1907c,
p. 371).
Einstein immediately points out, however, that up until now this general
claim has been elaborated solely on the basis of considerations pertaining to
very specific cases.33 This necessitates a more general investigation of the
precise scope and justification of this energy-mass dependency. As of now,
however, a general answer to this question cannot be given, because we do
not yet have a world view in conformity with the principle of relativity (“ein
vollsta¨ndiges, dem Relativita¨tsprinzip entsprechendes Weltbild”) (1907c, p.
371 – 372). Any investigation of the energy-mass dependency is therefore for
now obliged to proceed by means of specific cases in the domain of relativistic
32See Miller (1981, p. 236 – 238) for a more extensive discussion of this paper.
33He refers here to his (1906a) article on the principle of the constancy of centre-of-mass
motion.
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electrodynamics, since in that domain we are on secure ground. At the same
time, however, Einstein is also well aware of the limitations of proceeding in
this way, since he points out that his recent research on radiation, specific
heats, and the light quantum has shown that the Maxwell equations have
only limited validity.34 In the case considered, however, this does not pose a
problem, since it does not concern these specific phenomena.
What is interesting about these remarks is that they elaborate how Ein-
stein saw the heuristic approach to the theory of relativity. Applying the
principles of the theory to the electrodynamic laws governing specific cases
leads to what he called, in the reply to Ehrenfest, “additional statements”
(Einstein, 1907a, p. 206), such as the statement that there is a specific mass-
energy dependency. Given, however, that at the time no relativistic world
view is available yet, the only way to investigate further such claims is by a
piecemeal approach, i.e. by applying the principles to specific issues in elec-
trodynamics, since it is only there that the principles find a secure ground.
Only once the theory also covers quantum phenomena will we be in a posi-
tion to account, in a general way, for the additional statements obtained by
applying the principles to specific cases.
After these remarks on a future relativistic world view, Einstein then
starts, in §1, with a discussion of the way in which the kinetic energy of
a rigid body in uniform translation subject to external forces is handled
by relativity theory (1907c, p. 373 – 377). Applying these insights, in §2,
to electrically charged rigid bodies then brings Einstein to an equation for
34Einstein refers here to some of his earlier articles on light quanta: (1905c), (1906b),
(1907d).
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their kinetic energy which differs, he points out, from the equation obtained
earlier for the kinetic energy of a non-charged rigid body. This entails that
an electrostatically charged body possesses an inertial mass that surpasses
that of a non-charged body, and as such this special case provides evidence
for the inertia of energy (1907c, p. 379).
In §3, Einstein then turns his attention towards a relativistic treatment
of the dynamics of the rigid body, the attainment of which, he claims, could
seem to be near at hand on the basis of §1 and §2. He warns, however,
that the claims of §1, on which the results of §2 are based, only hold for
situations where the forces involved are constant over time. If this is not
the case, he shows by means of a simple example, we are led to results that
would contradict the work-energy principle. After showing that this problem
cannot be resolved, in relativistic terms, by appealing to the instantaneous
spread of force, he is then brought to restate his answer to Ehrenfest’s ques-
tion (see page 27): “if relativistic electrodynamics is correct, we are still far
from having a dynamics of the parallel translation of the rigid body” (1907c,
p. 381). In the final section, Einstein then concludes with a discussion of
the energy of a system of mass-points in force-free motion, a special case
that, again, provides evidence for the general claim about the inertia-energy
relation stated at the beginning of the paper (1907c, p. 384).
What is of interest here now are not primarily the results obtained by
Einstein, but rather the choice of topics: the kinematics and dynamics of the
(charged) rigid body. This is surpisingly in line with Einstein’s response to
Ehrenfest’s challenge that, at that time, both a kinematics and dynamics of
the rigid body for the electron were to be considered as unknown (see page
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27). As such, this indicates that Einstein was actually concerned with the
issue raised by Ehrenfest concerning the dynamics of the electron, and that
he attempted to find a suitable relativistic answer to it. Moreover, the paper
offers a good illustration of how Einstein employed the principle of relativity
as a heuristic instrument for investigating such issues: it is through the
application of the principle of relativity and the light postulate, incorporated
in the relativistic time- and length-transformations, to particular laws of
physics – in this case the principle of the conservation of energy and the
Maxwell equations, with the scope restriction discussed above – that we can
obtain further statements about a particular domain – in this case statements
about the inertia of energy in the domain of relativistic electrodynamics.
At the same time, the paper also shows that the application of the prin-
ciples of the theory of relativity to the laws of physics should not be seen
as the final word: as Einstein points out in the introduction, a final account
will have to be formulated in terms of a view that can accommodate the
insights obtained in his work on quanta and light- and radiation-phenomena.
As such, it is clear that Einstein was well aware that there were limitations
to the way in which relativity theory was formulated at the time, but also
that he believed that these limitations could be overcome: while he now still
needed to proceed by means of particular cases, he does seem to indicate in
the introduction that the attainment of a complete world view corresponding
to the principle of relativity is possible.
This now shows that Einstein considered the issue raised by Ehrenfest,
concerning the relativistic view on the dynamics of the electron, to be pressing
and important. As such, this provides an argument against Janssen’s claim
31
(i) that Einstein already in 1905 saw that the velocity-dependence of mass
was a purely kinematical phenomenon, and that a relativistic study of it is
independent from the dynamics of the system displaying the behaviour. It
also shows that, in its present form of a piecemeal heuristics, the principle of
relativity and the light postulate in themselves were not suited to provide a
complete answer to the question. In order to understand how a relativistic
reply to this issue raised by Kaufmann’s experiments and the electromagnetic
program eventually did come about,35 we will now turn to Planck’s work on
the experiments and his general dynamics.
3.2. Relativity, Radiation and the Electron
We turn now to Planck because it is mainly his work that allowed for
the elaboration of a relativistic response to Kaufmann’s experiments and the
electromagnetic program. We will focus here, more specifically, on four of his
articles in which he discusses these issues explicitly: his (1906a) elaboration of
a relativistic mechanics; his (1906b) analysis of Kaufmann’s experiments; his
(1908a) elaboration of a general dynamics; and his (1908b) discussion of the
principle of action and reaction.36 In this way, it will also become clear how
35In his (1907c), Einstein does not refer to the results of the Kaufmann experiments,
nor does he mention any of the existing conceptions of the electron. He does refer to
Kaufmann once, but not with regards to his experiments. Einstein rather remarks that he
will probably repeat claims made earlier by other authors, but that he should be pardoned
for not offering an overview of the existing literature. He then expresses the hope that
others will fill up this gap, as has been done by Kaufmann and Planck for his (1905a)
relativity article (1907c, p. 373).
36Planck’s direct engagement with these issues stands in stark contrast with Einstein’s,
who only explicitly refers to Kaufmann’s experiments in his (1907b) review article. Ein-
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Planck’s work provided the context in which a tentative relativistic response
to Ehrenfest’s challenge could be elaborated by Einstein (1909a; 1909b).
Planck’s relativistic mechanics. Planck first discusses Kaufmann’s results in
his (1906a) elaboration of a mechanics on the basis of the principle of rela-
tivity, which he presents as the claim that
none of two frames of reference (x, y, z, t) and (x′, y′, z′, t′) related by
the relativistic transformations for lengths and times can be considered
as the rightful frame of reference for the fundamental equations of
mechanics and electrodynamics, and none of them can thus be called
“at rest”. (Planck, 1906a, p. 136; personal translation)
Such an elaboration is required, according to Planck, because the applica-
tion of the principle of relativity to Newtonian mechanics, in its formulation
in terms of mass and acceleration, renders the relation between kinetic and
potential energy very complex (1906a, p. 137 – 138). He therefore proposes,
on the basis of a relativistic treatment of the force exerted by an electro-
magnetic field on a mass point endowed with a charge, to reformulate the
equations of mechanics in terms of the rate of change of momentum.37 This
stein does refer implicitly, however: in his (1905a, p. 919), he derives a prediction for the
electron’s longitudinal and transverse mass, and in his (1906c) he proposes an alternative
kind of experimental set up, involving cathode rays, to determine the velocity-dependence
of the electron’s mass.
37As an interesting aside, this discussion clearly shows how Planck, as Einstein did, also
employed the principle of relativity as a heuristic principle: it is the application of the
principle of relativity and the light postulate, in terms of the relativistic time- and length-
transformations, to the equations for the charged mass point’s electric and magnetic fields
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reformulation, as he shows in his concluding remarks, can also be captured
in Lagrangian and Hamiltonian terms (1906a, p. 139 – 141).38
This reformulation, as we will see later, will play an important role in
Planck’s analysis of Kaufmann’s experiments. It is not, however, the only
important aspect of this article. Equally significant is Planck’s introduction,
in which he discusses the issues raised by Kaufmann and the electromagnetic
program. He starts by pointing out that the principle of relativity, introduced
by Lorentz and generalized by Einstein, has led to a great simplification of
the electrodynamics of moving bodies. At the same time, the question of its
acceptability as a general, all-encompassing principle for physics also seems
to have been answered recently, by Kaufmann, in negative terms. We should
not, however, judge too rapidly, for the theory will eventually, according to
Planck, be brought in agreement with observation. Moreover, the least we
can do for a physical account that promises such simplicity and generality is
to investigate it as far as possible, even in the eye of fundamental challenges.
One of these challenges is the question of the work involved when a moving
electron undergoes deformation according to the principle of relativity, which
we can put aside for now, according to Planck, since it can be accounted for in
terms of the electron’s kinetic energy. One particular advantage of proceeding
that shows him how to reformulate the equations of motion. See Elie Zahar (1989, p. 227
– 237) for a thorough discussion of Planck’s paper.
38Miller (1981, p. 327 – 331) discusses how it was this reformulation by Planck that
corrected Einstein’s use of Newtonian mechanics in his derivation of the equations for the
electron’s longitudinal and transverse mass, which showed that the relativistic equations
were in fact identical to Lorentz’s for l = 1 (see footnote 15).
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in this way, he then points out, is that the issue of the electron’s precise
form is no longer of any real importance: it does not matter whether we
ascribe it a spherical form or any determinate form at all in order to calculate
the electron’s velocity-dependence (1906a, p. 137).39 What this shows is
that it is only by putting aside the issues that are of central importance
for the electromagnetic program – Kaufmann’s results and the constitution
of the electron – that Planck is able to open up a space for the further
investigation of the physical implications of the principle of relativity. In
this way, it becomes clear how pressing the challenge posed by the Kaufmann
experiments was for the theory of relativity at the time.
Planck and the Kaufmann experiments. It seems, however, that attempts
to carve out a space for the elaboration of the theory of relativity would
not really have been visible as long as the theory’s adherents did not ad-
dress what was taken to pose a direct challenge to the theory at the time,
namely Kaufmann’s experimental results. To overcome this, Planck (1906b)
therefore undertook a critical assessment of Kaufmann’s experimental set-up
and data.40 After praising Kaufmann’s precision and clarity, Planck starts
by outlining the main difference between Kaufmann’s original analysis and
39It is this claim that Ehrenfest picks up on later, as we have seen on page 24: according
to Ehrenfest, even when we refrain from ascribing a particular form to the relativistic
electron, its dynamics still poses an issue for the theory of relativity, since the theory
is not clear on whether inertial force-free motion is possible for such an electron in all
directions.
40Cushing (1981, p. 1142 – 1146) and Zahar (1989, p. 201 – 226) both offer a very
extensive discussion of the work undertaken by Planck in this paper.
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his re-analysis: while Kaufmann reduced the measured deflections (y¯, z¯) to
infinitely small deflections (y′, z′) in order to simplify the calculations re-
quired (Staley, 2008, p. 240), Planck will not carry out such a reduction.41
He will work with fully integrated equations for the electron’s motion, which
requires him to express them as Lagrangian functions in terms of the kinetic
potential H, in line with his (1906a) article. Combining these with the elec-
tromagnetic field values involved, Planck then provides his expressions for
the electric and magnetic deflection in terms of the momentum p = ∂H/∂q,
where q is the electron’s velocity. Applying these expressions to the values
obtained by Kaufmann then allows him to evaluate what he takes to be at
stake in the experiments: the way in which the velocity-dependence of the
electron’s momentum brings about the measured deflections y¯ and z¯. On
the basis of this it is then possible to compare the two theories involved,
Abraham’s ‘Kugeltheorie’42 and the Lorentz-Einstein ‘Relativtheorie’, with
respect to the different equations of motion they offer for the electron (1906b,
p. 756).
On the basis of this reconceptualization of Kaufmann’s experimental set-
up, Planck then draws evaluative comparisons on two different levels. The
first concerns the two theories involved, and how their predictions fare with
41The application of magnetic and electric fields influences the electrons constituting
the rays employed in the experimental set-up in such a way that they deviate from their
normal path, which gives rise to the curved line on the photographic plate. See (Cushing,
1981, p. 1138), (Hon, 1995, p. 179 – 180) and (Staley, 2008, p. 225) for a more techical
exposition of Kaufmann’s experiments and his data-analysis.
42This name stems from the fact that Abraham conceived of the electron as a sphere
(“Kugel”).
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respect to Planck’s re-interpretation of Kaufmann’s results in terms of the
velocity-dependence of the electron’s momentum p. The second level con-
cerns the calculation-method employed to analyse the data: Planck’s use of
fully integrated equations versus Kaufmann’s use of infinitely small deflec-
tions. With regards to the second level of comparison, Planck immediately
points out that there is no significant difference. And while, with regards to
the first level, the Kugeltheorie is closer to the results than the Relativtheo-
rie, we should not take this as definite evidence in favor of Abraham’s theory.
To make that claim, Planck argues, would require that the difference between
Abraham’s theory and the observed results would be small compared with
the difference between relativity and observation, and that is not the case
(1906b, p. 757). Planck then argues that the only reasonable conclusion to
be drawn from Kaufmann’s results at the moment is that more work needs
to be done if we want these kinds of measurements to function as a definite
arbiter between the two theories (1906b, p. 758).
Planck then sketches how this could be done, via a discussion of the
assumption underlying Kaufmann’s experiments that the biggest distinction
between the two theories is to be found in the high-velocity spectrum. By
means of his reformulation of the magnetic and electric deflection in terms
of the momentum p, he argues, however, that this is not necessarily the
case: in fact, it would be better to perform measurements on cathode rays,
which have a lower velocity than the Becquerel-rays employed by Kaufmann
(Planck, 1906b, p. 758). The advantage of employing cathode rays, according
to Planck, is that they have a third measurable characteristic besides their
magnetic and electric deflectability: their discharge potential P . He then
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sketches, as a conclusion to his paper, the way in which the different theories
offer a prediction for this quantity in terms of the radiation energy E (1906b,
p. 759).
We are now in a position to see how Planck attempted to defuse, by dif-
ferent means, the direct challenge posed by Kaufmann’s results. First, there
is his re-formulation of the issues at stake in the experiments. No longer are
they necessarily concerned with determining the electron’s longitudinal and
transverse mass in order to obtain insight into their rigid or deformable con-
stitution; we can equally well read them as being concerned with determining
the electron’s momentum, in order to obtain insight into the electron’s equa-
tions of motion. This is not just an innocent reformulation, for if we read it
in combination with Planck’s (1906a) paper, it becomes clear that underlying
this reformulation there is in fact a certain preference for a mechanics more
in line with the principle of relativity.43
Second, we have Planck’s proposal of an alternative to Kaufmann’s re-
liance on infinitely small deflections. The central aspect of this proposal is
that it allows Planck to introduce his reformulation of the experiments in
terms of the kinetic potential H and the electron’s momentum p, which, he
shows, leads to an analysis of Kaufmann’s data that performs equally well
43I claim that this reformulation is not innocent because, as Planck himself states in his
(1906a, p. 137) article, his foremost reason for reformulating the equations of mechanics
was not because of any particular problem, but rather because it would make the employ-
ment of the principle of relativity less complex. This is not an innocent move because this
was, of course, exactly what was at stake in the debates over the Kaufmann experiments,
i.e. whether it was possible to apply the principle in such cases.
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as Kaufmann’s. In this way, Planck opens up the possibility of disputing
Kaufmann’s interpretation of the data, since he can now argue that there
is an alternative interpretation which does not lead to the conclusion that
the data argue for Abraham’s theory, but rather to the conclusion that more
work needs to be done.
Finally, we have Planck’s suggestion of employing cathode rays. Kauf-
mann worked with high-velocity Becquerel-rays, because the velocities at-
tainable by means of cathode rays were too small to showcase any noticeable
mass increase, and as such these rays were not useful for investigating what
he was interested in, i.e. the velocity-dependence of mass (1906, p. 488).
Planck’s interest, however, is not primarily with the electron’s mass: as we
have seen, he proposed to reformulate the theoretical issues at stake in the
experiments in terms of the electron’s momentum and kinetic potential. As
such, the proposal to perform experiments on cathode rays forms part of
Planck’s attempt to shift the focus of the debate, while it also allowed him
to present the principle of relativity as open to experimental testing.44 In this
way, we see how Planck attempted, through his analysis of the Kaufmann
experiments, to defuse the challenge posed by Kaufmann’s results by shifting
the focus of the debate away from those issues that were of central concern
to the adherents of the electromagnetic program.
44Planck was not the first to present cathode ray experiments as an alternative to Kauf-
mann’s experiments: Einstein (1906c) had already done the same, in a much more detailed
way, and he repeats this proposal in his (1907c) review article. The main difference, how-
ever, is that Einstein still presented these experiments as primarily concerned with the
electron’s longitudinal and transverse mass.
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Planck’s General Dynamics. Einstein (1907a; 1907b) had to admit that the
principles of the theory of relativity could not yet offer a completely satisfy-
ing answer to Ehrenfest’s question concerning a relativistic dynamics of the
electron. Planck (1908a; 1908b) is the first to improve on this, in his work
on what he calls a general dynamics: a dynamics that, constrained by the
principle of relativity, covers not only mechanics in the narrow sense,45but
also thermodynamics and electrodynamics (1908b, p. 728).
What is new here, however, is that Planck does not proceed by means
of electrodynamic cases, as was customary in earlier elaborations of relativ-
ity. He rather turns to thermal radiation phenomena, which concern the
behavior of physical systems that are devoid of matter and only contain
electromagnetic energy, but which nonetheless obey the fundamental laws of
mechanics and thermodynamics (Planck, 1908a, p. 1). Planck’s main rea-
son for considering such systems is that they raise particular problems for
some fundamental assumptions taken for granted up until now in the field of
dynamics, of which he offers three examples.
The first is the belief that the total energy of a moving ponderable body
consists of the sum of its kinetic energy (which depends only on the body’s ve-
locity) and its internal energy (which depends on the bodies density, tempera-
ture, and chemical composition). Recent investigations have shown, however,
that such bodies also contain a finite amount of thermal radiation, for which
it is impossible to distinguish these two kinds of energy if the body is in
45With this Planck means Newtonian mechanics, which he also often describes as ‘pure’
or ‘normal’ mechanics in the article. We will return to how Planck saw the relation between
the theory of relativity and normal mechanics on in footnote 51.
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motion. The distinction between kinetic and internal energy is therefore not
tenable anymore across the board (Planck, 1908a, p. 1 – 3).
The second is the assumption that a body’s inertial mass (“tra¨ge Masse”)
forms an absolute, fundamental, and unchangeable element of physics, which
is most directly defined, Planck points out, in terms of the body’s kinetic
energy. In the case of thermal radiation, however, it becomes clear that this
constancy assumption cannot be maintained: the energy of such radiation,
which depends on the system’s temperature, contributes a part – which,
following the previous assumption, cannot be grouped under either kinetic
or internal energy – to the system’s inertial mass, which entails that this
mass becomes temperature-dependent (1908a, p. 3).46
The final concerns the assumed general identity between inertial and pon-
derable mass.47 The issue is that, while thermal radiation phenomena clearly
have inertial mass, it is difficult to ascribe them ponderable mass. This issue
in particular shows that a new general dynamics is called for, since it shows
the possibility of rigid bodies whose laws of motion completely differ from
46An important consequence of this for our story here, which will be discussed later on,
is that this also diminishes the physical significance of the distinction between ‘true’ and
‘apparent’ mass (1908a, p. 3 – 4). See footnote 11 for a short discussion of this distinction.
47Planck does not specify what he means by ponderable mass. Given his reconceptual-
ization of mass in terms of energy at the end of the article, however, it seems that what
Planck is trying to argue here is that a distinction needs to be made between the ponder-
able mass of material bodies and inertial mass, since radiation energy does have mass but
is not ponderable in the sense of material. For more discussion of the different concepts
of mass that were around during this period, see chapters 11, 12 and 13 of Max Jammer’s
(1961, p. 136 – 190).
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those of ordinary mechanics (Planck, 1908a, p. 4).
A thorough revision of the foundations of dynamics is therefore required,
which, according to Planck, should be guided only by those principles that
can claim exact validity in the face of these new findings. The first princi-
ple employed will be the principle of least action, which, as Hermann von
Helmholtz had shown in (1895), comprises mechanics, electrodynamics and
thermodynamics in their application to reversible processes.48 This is not
yet sufficient, however, since the principle in itself does not yet lead us to a
replacement for the defective distinction between kinetic and internal energy.
This can be achieved, however, by making use of the principle of relativity,
which Planck expresses in more or less the same terms as in his (1906a) (see
page 3.2): the relativistic time- and length-transformations entail that there
is no more need for one specific rest-frame for the laws of mechanics, electro-
dynamics, and, he adds now, thermodynamics. He now also adds the light
postulate by stating that c = c′ (1908a, p. 12).
Planck starts his study of a general dynamics constrained by these two
principles by turning to a particular phenomenon, black-body radiation.49
48Reversible processes, as Planck himself points out a bit later in the article, are those
changes to a system that are so slow that, for each instant of time, the system is in a
stationary state (1908a, p. 7). What Helmholtz had shown, according to Planck, is that
when the principle of least action is applied to changes of a body’s state that are reversible,
one can obtain differential equations for a body’s pressure p, entropy S and the force
exerted on it expressed in terms of the body’s kinetic potential H, its velocity q, its volume
V and its temperature T (Planck, 1908a, p. 10). As we will see, this characterization of a
body’s state will prove central to Planck’s formulation of his relativistic dynamics.
49A black body is a “cavity with perfectly absorbing (i.e. black) walls”, which, if its
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His reason for this is that it is the only physical system for which we can
specify its thermodynamical, electrodynamical and mechanical properties
with absolute precision, independently of any conflicts between these the-
ories (Planck, 1908a, p. 7). On the assumption that all changes occuring to
the system are reversible, its state can be completely characterized in terms
of its velocity q, its volume V and its temperature T . Planck then shows
how to express the system’s momentum G, its energy E, and its pressure p
in terms of these independent variables, and how this leads to the first and
second law of thermodynamics for black-body radiation (1908a, p. 7 – 9).
On the basis of this particular case, Planck then turns to the dynamics
of material bodies in general.50 The state of such a system can equally well
be determined in terms of the independent variables V, T , and the velocity-
components x˙, y˙, z˙. When the state of such a system is changed in a reversible
way (see footnote 48), the principle of least action then provides us with
expressions, in terms of the system’s kinetic potential H, for the force it
experiences, its pressure and its entropy.
Planck then points out that, up until now, it was assumed that the sys-
temperature is kept steady at specific temperature, will be filled with radiation energy:
this is black-body radiation (Kuhn, 1978, p. 3). At the time, the physical study of this
phenomenon was concerned, more in particular, with investigating how the intensity of
such radiation depended on wavelength or frequency (Gearheart, 2002, p. 170). It was
also in this domain that the concept of the quantum was first developed by Planck. For
some extensive historical work on this episode, see the references in footnote 54.
50He conceives of such bodies as consisting of a definite number of molecules, which
can be either identical in kind or different, and possibly zero in number, in which case we
obtain the black-body case.
43
tem’s kinetic potential consisted of two parts, its internal energy F (inde-
pendent of q), and its constant mass M : H = 1
2
Mq2 − F . If we hold on to
this assumption, the principle of least action will lead us to the equations
of what he describes as ordinary mechanics and ordinary thermodynamics
(Planck, 1908a, p. 11)51. Thermal radiation phenomena have shown, how-
ever, that this distinction between two kinds of energy is no longer tenable
(see page 40). To overcome this, Planck then turns to the principle of rela-
tivity. He employs this principle, together with the principle of least action,
to investigate how the physical quantities discussed above (entropy, temper-
ature, volume, pressure, . . . ) transform between different frames of reference
(1908a, p. 13 – 17). This then leads Planck to the transformation equations
for the kinetic potential H (1908a, p. 17).
It is this last relation that is of central importance for Planck, since in
combination with the principle of least action, it allows us to determine
the way in which the values of any physical quantity are related between
two reference frames in relative motion (1908a, p. 20). This result not only
leads him to a whole list of invariant properties (1908a, p. 23), but also
to the following claim: the kinetic potential H and all state variables of
the systems under consideration here can all be specified as functions of
their velocity, volume and temperature, under the condition that they are
51Here we thus see how, for Planck, normal mechanics is to be seen as an approximation
of his relativistic dynamics: for those cases where the internal thermal radiation of a
body makes no significant difference, we can assume the distinction between kinetic and
internal energy, in which case the principle of least action will lead us to the laws of normal
mechanics (Planck, 1908a, p. 11).
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known as functions of the system’s volume and temperature for velocity zero
(Planck, 1908a, p. 24).
Planck then turns to some of the implications of these results. Of partic-
ular importance here is his discussion of the concept of inertial mass. This
quantity is determined by a body’s momentum, which entailed, in pure me-
chanics (see footnote 51), that a body’s inertial mass was seen as a constant
of fundamental importance. According to Planck’s general dynamics, how-
ever, it is a notion of only secondary importance: since momentum is no
longer directly proportional to velocity, a body’s mass no longer constitutes
a constant. One particular consequence of this, Planck points out, is that
the velocity-dependence of mass becomes primarily an issue of definition
(“Definitionssache”): depending on how one relates mass to momentum, one
obtains a different velocity-dependence.52
Planck then shows that, starting with a particular definition, which takes
mass as the ratio of momentum and velocity (M = G/q), one can obtain the
expressions for a system’s longitudinal and transverse mass. He immediately
points out, however, that this definition cannot be the final word, since it
cannot be tested directly, for example, by thermodynamic means.53 In fact,
52Planck lists a few possibilities: one option conceives of mass as the ratio of the mo-
mentum to the velocity G/q; another option is to differentiate the velocity q, in which
case there are further options depending on how one differentiates; still another possibility
is to represent a body’s mass not in terms of momentum but in terms of its energy E
differentiated to q2/2 (1908a, p. 27).
53This elaboration also makes clear that these notions of longitudinal and transverse
mass should no longer be seen as fundamental in any sense, as they were when Abraham
first conceptualized them (see footnote 11). Rather, depending on how one differentiates
45
further analysis of this definition within the framework of his general dynam-
ics shows that it is easier to leave aside questions of how to define a body’s
mass, and that we should rather conceive of physical bodies as consisting
fundamentally of energy (1908a, p. 27 – 29).
In this way, it becomes clear how particular dynamical considerations
concerning the black-body played an important role in the elaboration of
Planck’s general dynamics. The reason why black-body radiation is so suit-
able for these kinds of investigations is exactly the fact that the phenomenon
embodies that which Planck (and Einstein) considered to be central to a rel-
ativistic approach to physics, i.e. that it brings together all kinds of physical
laws (mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, . . . ) under a few gen-
eral principles. It is because the phenomenon’s constitution involves these
different physical laws that its dynamics can inform us about how a general
dynamics should look like from a relativistic point of view.
It also shows clearly how the elaboration of a relativistic response to the
issues raised by Kaufmann’s experiments equally well relied on dynamical
considerations: it is through the study of the inertial mass of black-body ra-
diation that Planck is led, in the end, to claim that the velocity-dependence
of mass is primarily an issue of definition. The real difference with the elec-
tromagnetic approach is therefore not, as Janssen claims, that the relativistic
this ratio, one can obtain, in the case of black-body radiation, at least four different
notions of velocity-dependent mass: the moving system’s transverse mass; its longitudinal
isothermal-isochoric (constant temperature and constant volume) mass; its longitudinal
adiabatic-isochoric (no heat transfer and constant volume) mass; and its longitudinal
adiabatic-isobaric (no heat transfer and constant pressure) mass (Planck, 1908a, p. 28)
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study of the velocity-dependence of mass was independent of any dynamical
considerations. The difference rather concerns the kind of dynamical system
considered: whereas Abraham and Lorentz attempted to account for Kauf-
mann’s results in terms of the dynamics of the electron, Planck elaborated
the relativistic response in terms of the dynamics of black-body radiation.
This difference can be understood by taking into account what these different
systems embodied. The electron carried the promise of a complete electro-
magnetic theory of matter, and hence it was the preferred object of study
for the electromagnetic approach. Black-body radiation, on the other hand,
carried the promise of a general theory bringing together all kinds of physi-
cal laws in a general theory. As such, we see how the choice of the preferred
object of study aligns with the general aims that these different approaches
tried to impose on the practice of fundamental physics at the time.
At the same time, however, we should not take Planck’s general dynamics
to establish, on the basis of theoretical considerations, that the velocity-
dependence of mass is merely an issue of definition. Planck has rather shown
this on the assumption that the principle of relativity applies to the whole of
physics. And, as we have seen, it is this assumption that is exactly at stake,
at least according to Abraham, Ehrenfest and Kaufmann. As such, Planck’s
work should not be seen as a definite rebuttal of the challenge posed by the
experiments, but rather as a relativistic alternative to the electromagnetic
interpretation of Kaufmann’s results. To understand how the relativistic
interpretation came to be seen as the only viable one, we will now turn to
the ways in which Einstein and Planck attempted to incorporate aspects of
the electromagnetic program within the theory of relativity.
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Einstein and the Constitution of Radiation. In his (1909a) paper, Einstein
turns to what he calls “an extremely important problem”: the constitution of
radiation (1909a, p. 185). This issue arises, he claims, because the Maxwell
equations for empty space in themselves “do not say anything” (Einstein,
1909a, p. 185): they only offer an intermediary construct, which needs to
be supplemented by other claims in order to say anything about the phe-
nomena. The issue is a pressing one, he continues, because many of the
current attempts to address it – Einstein discusses work by James Jeans,
Lorentz, and Walther Ritz – do not provide satisfactory solutions, since they
do not fit the facts. And while we have a radiation law that does fit all
known facts, the theoretical foundations on which Planck built his distribu-
tion law are, according to Einstein, incompatible with this law (1909a, p. 186
– 188). Einstein is therefore brought to reconsider the theoretical assump-
tions underlying the study of radiation phenomena, and for this he turns
to his quantum-hypothesis, which he had elaborated earlier in his (1905c;
1906b; 1907d; 1907f).54 Here he presents it as follows:
54It was this work on the quantum that Einstein described as “sehr revolutiona¨r”, in a
letter to his good friend Conrad Habicht in which he discussed all the work he was carrying
out in his annus mirabulis, 1905 (Klein et al., 1993, Doc. 27, p. 31 – 32). It showed him,
as we have seen earlier, the limitations of any approach based on the Maxwell equations
(see page 29 and Miller (1981, p. 133)). There is by now quite some extensive literature
on the early stages of the quantum, especially regarding the interpretation of Planck’s
(1901a; 1901b) articles, which has even spawned a kind of meta-investigation on how
historians have studied it: see e.g. the work by Martin J. Klein (1962; 1979), Thomas
Kuhn (1978), Olivier Darrigol (2001), Clayton Gearheart (2002), Suman Seth (2010), and
the references therein. For a historical discussion of Einstein’s (1909a; 1909b) work, see
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A structure that is capable of carrying out oscillations with the fre-
quency ν, and which, due to its possession of an electric charge, is
capable of converting radiation energy into energy of matter and vice
versa, cannot assume oscillation states of any arbitrary energy, but
rather only such oscillation states whose energy is a multiple of h · ν.
Here h is the constant so designated by Planck, which appears in his
radiation equation. (Einstein, 1909a, p. 188)
The central conclusion of Einstein’s quantum-work, as he shows by means of
a discussion of his interpretation of Planck’s distribution law (1909a, p. 188
– 190), was that Planck’s constant h was independent of the particulars of
the physical systems studied by Planck in its derivation, and that it in fact
pointed towards the existence of a discrete entity, the quantum of energy.
The hypothesis that oscillation energy can only occur in quanta, expressed as
multiples of h and ν, does not just concern the amount of radiation emitted
and absorbed, but rather the constitution of radiation itself: it is “as if
radiation consisted of quanta of the indicated magnitude” (1909a, p. 191).
After a discussion of the experimental implications of his quantum-work,
Einstein then concludes his paper with a sketch of what a theory of the
constitution of radiation would look like.
For this, he turns to a discussion of how such a theory should treat a
closed space containing an ideal gas, radiation, and ions that mediate an
energy exchange between the radiation and the gas. Elaborating this then
allows him to express the four quantities required to treat this case (the mean
energy η of a molecular structure; the light velocity c; the electric charge ;
Russel McCormmach (1970).
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and the frequency ν) in terms of the fundamental constants that figure in
Planck’s distribution law (1909a, p. 192). The most important consequence
of this result, Einstein then points out, is that the equation he obtains for
Planck’s constant, h = 2/c, relates the light quantum constant h to the
electric charge  (Einstein calls it the elementary quantum of electricity).
This is a very significant result, since it suggests to Einstein that a theory
accounting for the quantum could equally well account for the electron’s
constitution:
The most important aspect of this derivation is that it relates the
light quantum constant h to the elementary quantum  of electricity.
We should remember that the elementary quantum  is an outsider in
Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics.55 Outside forces must be enlisted
in order to construct the electron in the theory; usually, one introduces
a rigid framework to prevent the electron’s electrical masses from fly-
ing apart under the influence of their electric interaction. The relation
h = 2/c seems to me to indicate that the same modification of the
theory that will contain the elementary quantum  as a consequence
will also contain the quantum structure of radiation as a consequence.
(Einstein, 1909a, p. 192 – 193)
This now leads Einstein to a lists of constraints on the equation (or sys-
tem of equations) that would constitute such a theory, one of which is that
55Here, Einstein refers to an article by Tullio Levi-Civita (1907), which, according to the
editors of the Einstein papers, presented “a solution of the field equations corresponding
to the motion of a stable, isolated charge moving at the speed of light” (1989, p. 553; note
67).
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the equation should transform into itself under application of the Lorentz
transformation. And while such an equation is not yet available, Einstein
concludes, we should not despair, since there do not seem to be that many
possible candidates (1909a, p. 193).
As such, considerations pertaining to radiation phenomena were central
to Einstein’s elaboration of a relativistic response to the issues raised by
the Kaufmann experiments, as they were for Planck (see page 46). More
specifically, Einstein’s quantum-work led him to an outline for a theory of
the electron’s constitution, because it indicated that the study of the con-
stitutive entities of radiation and electricity should not focus primarily on
the Maxwell equations: these only offer an intermediary structure (“eine
Zwischenkonstruktion”) that in itself does not say anything about the phe-
nomena (1909a, p. 185), which entails that the electric elementary quantum
 is a stranger (“ein Fremdling”) to the Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics
(1909a, p. 192). On such a view, the Maxwell equations should therefore no
longer be taken to inform us directly about any fundamental domain, as the
electromagnetic program assumed. In this way, we thus see how the result
of Einstein’s (1909a) work on radiation and the quantum, i.e. the relation-
ship between the light quantum h and the electric charge , allows him to
incorporate the central aim of the electromagnetic program – to investigate
the nature and constitution of charge – within the framework of relativity. It
also provided him with a way to address the issue raised by Ehrenfest con-
cerning the dynamics of the electron. At the same time, however, Einstein
also generalizes the issue: the relativistic dynamics of the rigid body required
to address Ehrenfest’s issue no longer serves solely to account for the elec-
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tron, but equally well for the quantum. In this way, Einstein thus transforms
Ehrenfest’s issue: from a direct challenge to the theory of relativity, he is
able to incorporate it within the relativistic research program.
Experiment and Historiography. It is important to stress here, however, that
this incorporation was not carried through solely on the basis of theoreti-
cal considerations, as Janssen claims (2009, p. 35). Instead, it seems that
at least two other factors – experimental and historiographical considera-
tions– also played an important role, as I will try to argue here.56 Regarding
the experimental factors, we have already seen that it was only because of
Planck’s thorough-going analysis of the material and conceptual machinery
underlying Kaufmann’s experimental set-up that the experimental challenge
posed to the principle of relativity was defused. That experiment also played
an important role for Einstein, is shown by the fact that he often employed
radiation phenomena to develop possible experimental tests of the principle
of relativity: in his (1906c), for example, he proposes an experiment on cath-
ode rays57 in order to test what he calls the Lorentz-Einstein prediction of
the velocity-dependence of mass against Abraham’s and Bucherer’s; and his
short discussion of the Kaufmann experiments in his review article leads him
56Compared to the discussion before, these points will be rather schematic and short,
because there is less direct material available to build them. In combination with my
discussion of these aspects in Minkowski’s and Laue’s work, however, I do believe that
they point to something significant.
57The generation of cathode rays is one of the first phenomena that, according to Ein-
stein, required an account in terms of the quantum: he discussed these already in his first
quantum paper, (1905c), as posing problems for wave-approaches.
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to the claim that more experimentation on both cathode and Becquerel-rays
is needed to investigate whether the foundations of relativity are in corre-
spondence with the observable facts (1907c, p. 439).58
Radiation phenomena, moreover, did not solely offer a domain to test
particular consequences of the theory of relativity: they also offered the
opportunity to test what Einstein considered to be the physical core of the
theory, i.e. its claims about rods, clocks and light signals. This shows itself in
Einstein’s (1907e) article, in which he discusses the possibility of a new test
of the relativity principle. His starting point here is an article by Johannes
Stark (1906) in which he showed, by investigating the Doppler effect in canal
58This is the only place where Einstein explicitly discusses the Kaufmann experiments:
even in his (1906c) proposal for alternative experiments, he does not refer to them. In §10
of this review article, Einstein discusses possible experimental tests for theories concerned
with the motion of (charged) material point particles. After outlining how such theories
could be tested by means of cathode rays, he then discusses Kaufmann’s experiments on
Becquerel rays: he presents the material set-up employed, and then reproduces the curve
with the relativistic results. (In contrast to Kaufmann’s original curve, Einstein does
not reproduce Abraham’s and Bucherer’s results.) After referring to Planck’s (1906b)
re-analysis of the experiments, which has shown, according to Einstein, that Kaufmann’s
calculations are error-free, he then states that the systematic deviations of the theory of
relativity from the results can be the consequence of either a not-yet-discovered source of
error, or of a mismatch between the theory’s foundations and observation, and that only
more observations can decide this question. After admitting that Abraham and Bucherer
scored better with regards to this particular experiment, he then states, however, that we
should not ascribe them too high a probability, since their basic assumptions concerning
the electron do not fit well with theories that concern a broader scope of phenomena
(1907c, p. 436 – 439).
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rays, that the positive ions in motion constituting these rays send out line
spectra. Stark also attempted to carry out second-order measurements of this
effect, but according to Einstein his experimental set-up was not adequately
suited for this. Einstein then argues that the fundamental principles of the
theory of relativity – the principles of relativity and of the constancy of the
velocity of light – in fact predict this effect, and that this entails a formula
which differs significantly from Stark’s results. As such, carrying out Stark’s
experiments in a more precise way would allow us to test the principle of
relativity. Of primary importance here, is that Einstein does not take this
experiment to be concerned with a particular consequence of the theory, but
with the principle itself, as the title of the (1907e) paper indicates. This
becomes clear when Einstein returns to these results in his review article,
and presents the oscillating ions studied by Stark as an illustration of the
relativistic behavior of clocks (1907c, p. 422).59 In this way, we see how,
for Einstein, experimental considerations pertaining to radiation phenomena
played an important role in the elaboration of the theory of relativity as an
alternative to the electromagnetic program.
Besides such experimental considerations, historiographical factors also
59Encouraged by Einstein (see the letter from Einstein to Stark on the 13th of April 1907
(Klein et al., 1993, Doc. 45, p. 47)), Stark continued this reseach. This led him to claim,
in his (1907) article, that the phenomenon provided the first experimental confirmation of
the quantum-hypothesis underlying Planck’s radiation law. See note 5 to Einstein’s letter
to Jakob Laub, in which he describes Stark’s application of the quantum-theory as very
important (“sehr wichtig”), for an overview of historical work on Stark’s claim (Klein et
al., 1993, Doc. 125, p. 144).
54
played an important role. This becomes clear, for example, in the addresses
Planck (1908b) and Einstein (1909b) gave to the Naturforscherversamm-
lung, the annual meeting of the German physics community. In these talks,
both Planck and Einstein constructed what Staley calls research histories,
i.e. “accounts of the past [. . . ] that scientists offer in key papers and re-
view studies[, which] play a substantive role in shaping understandings of
new theory” (2008, p. 294; original emphasis).60 What is significant about
these research histories is that they both sketch a historical progression, from
issues pertaining to electrodynamical and radiation phenomena towards the
principle of relativity, that no longer presents the electromagnetic program as
a challenge to the theory of relativity, but rather as part of the development
towards it.
Planck’s (1908b) talk was concerned with whether it was possible to for-
mulate a unified concept of momentum that covers all the different domains
of his general dynamics, just as the principle of action and reaction – which
essentially, for Planck, concerns the conservation of momentum – did for New-
tonian mechanics. This question first became pressing, according to Planck,
when Lorentz’s electrodynamics employed an ether-concept that denied the
principle its general validity. An account that corrected this situation was
then presented by Abraham, who showed that the generality of the principle
could be saved, if one introduced an electromagnetic notion of momentum
60These are not the only research histories constructed for the theory of relativity. Chap-
ter 8 of Staley’s book (2008, p. 294 – 343) offers an extensive discussion of how Einstein,
Planck and others throughout this period crafted the history of the theory of relativity in
their work.
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besides the mechanical one. Abraham did this by means of an analogy: just
as the principle of the conservation of energy can only be upheld when one
takes into account electromagnetic energy, so one can only uphold the prin-
ciple of action and reaction by introducing the concept of electromagnetic
momentum. There is one problem, however, with Abraham’s analogy be-
tween energy and momentum, according to Planck: there were already many
different conceptions of energy at the time, which entails that the intro-
duction of a new one did not constitute any radical change; with regards to
momentum, however, we only had one conception, the mechanical one, which
means that just introducing a second one entails a radical loss of simplicity
and the introduction of substantial complexity. This then urges Planck to
introduce his central question regarding a unified conception of momentum,
and to show how the principle of relativity offers an adequate answer to it
in terms of what he calls the law of the inertia of energy (1908b, p. 828 –
830).61
The central point here about the historical lineage drawn by Planck con-
cerns the way in which he is able to present Abraham’s work on electro-
magnetic momentum and energy as part of the development towards his
relativistic solution to the problem posed by Lorentz’s electrodynamics. In
this way, Planck puts to the side the fact that Abraham proposed his notions
in the context of the electromagnetic program: he did not intend them as ad-
ditions, but rather as fundamental replacements for the mechanical concepts.
61In short, this law states that “the effect of forces acting on a body [is] transmitted
by a momentum density whose source [is] a flow of energy” (Miller, 1981, p. 366). Miller
there also gives a short overview of the rest of Planck’s (1908b) paper.
56
His historiography also allows Planck to set aside the fact that Abraham’s
electromagnetic notions, in the context of the Kaufmann experiments, actu-
ally posed a challenge for the use of the principle of relativity as the guiding
principle for the foundations of physics. As such, Planck’s history turns
Abraham’s electromagnetic theory into a predecessor of the central insight
provided by the theory of relativity, i.e. the inertia of energy. In doing so,
the electromagnetic program is no longer presented as a challenger to the
principle of relativity, but rather as a step towards the real solution, the
relativistic one.
Content-wise, Einstein’s (1909b) talk is more or less the same as his
(1909a) article: his topic is the constitution of radiation, and he addresses
this issue by means of the suggestion that a theory accounting for both the
electric charge and the light quantum should be developed. What is signif-
icant here, however, is that he proceeds by constructing a common history
for the quantum, the electron, and the principles of the theory of relativity.
His starting point for this are the first wave-conceptions of light, which gave
rise to the development of the ether-concept, later employed by Maxwell in
his electromagnetic theory. He then turns to the Michelson-Morley experi-
ment, and Lorentz’s treatment of it, which leads him to argue that it was
unsatisfactory, since it did not grasp the central insight of experiment: the
principle of relativity (1909b, p. 819). Einstein then highlights one particular
consequence of the theory of relativity, namely that a body’s inertial mass
decreases by L/c2 when it emits the radiation energy L. The importance
of this relativistic consequence, Einstein claims, is that it leads to signifi-
cant modifications for the basic ideas (“Grundanschauungen”) of physics: it
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indicates that light has particular corpuscularian aspects (1909b, p. 820).
However, because the theory of relativity in itself cannot offer us a theory of
the constitution of light and radiation, Einstein turns to a discussion of his
quantum-hypothesis, which proceeds along very similar lines as his (1909a)
article, namely towards the suggestion of a theory that would account for
both the corpuscularian and wave-aspects of light.
As such, Einstein’s historiography draws a straight line from issues with
wave-conceptions of light towards relativity and the quantum, which both, in
their own way, point towards corpuscularian aspects of light. A first signifi-
cant point about this is that the historical progression is no longer one from
investigations into electromagnetic radiation towards the electron, as Kauf-
mann presented it in his Naturforscherversammlung lecture (1901b); this
historical trajectory rather becomes part of the historical line from research
on electromagnetic light phenomena to the principle of relativity and the
quantum. A second point is that Einstein presents this historical progression
as very much a shared history and future: as his title already indicates, his
talk is concerned with the development of our ideas (“unserer Anschauun-
gen”) on the constitution of radiation, where this ‘our’, given the occasion
at which Einstein gave his talk, probably is supposed to refer to the whole
German physics community; and the next big thing in theoretical physics,
according to Einstein, will be the development of the wave-and-corpuscle-
theory he suggests at the end (1909b, p. 817). As such, we see how historio-
graphical considerations also played a significant role in the establishment of
the theory of relativity as the only viable approach to fundamental physics,
and of the electromagnetic worldview as something that had functioned as a
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stepping stone towards the theory of relativity, but now formed a world view
in decline, as Helge Kragh calls it (1999, p. 114).
We thus see how, for both Planck and Einstein, their work on radiation
phenomena was closely intertwined with their work on the theory of relativity,
and this on different levels: theoretical, experimental and historiographical.
This close connection now provides a good argument against Janssen’s claim
(i) that the (1905a) relativistic derivation of the velocity-dependence of mass
shows that the phenomenon is purely kinematical , and that the relativis-
tic study of this phenomenon is completely independent of any dynamical
considerations pertaining to the systems displaying such behaviour. For it
shows that both Einstein and Planck took the consequences of the theory
to be in need of a theoretical elaboration, one which they thought would
be provided in terms of the quantum. This also shows, again, how Planck’s
and Einstein’s employment of the principles of the theory of relativity was
essentially heuristic in nature. Both employ the principles by applying them
to particular laws that are suppposed to govern openstanding problems or
phenomena of interest, which leads them to new possible claims regarding
these phenomena. These relativistic claims then in turn function as the start-
ing point for further investigations of the underlying physical structure that
brings about these phenomena.
This close connection also provides a good argument against Janssen’s
claim (ii) that it were theoretical considerations that established the theory of
relativity as a replacement for the electromagnetic world view. For it shows
that both experimental and historiographical considerations pertaining to
radiation phenomena and their relation to relativity and the electron also
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played an important role in the elaboration of the theory of relativity as
an alternative for the electromagnetic program: it was by incorporating the
study of the electron into the relativistic program that Einstein and Planck
were able to defuse the electromagnetic challenge.
In the following section, this approach to the theory of relativity, with
its heuristic conception of the theory’s principles, and its experimental and
historiographical relation to radiation phenomena, will be contrasted with
the Minkowskian approach. This will then allow me, in a historical way, to
address both Janssen’s particular claim that it was Laue’s work on Ehren-
fest’s issue that definitely showed the kinematical nature of the velocity-
dependence of mass, and his general claim (iii) that this shows that Minkowskian
framework provides the natural interpretation for the theory of relativity
(Janssen, 2009, p. 39). That such a distinction between these two approaches
can, and needs to be, drawn, is already suggested by the fact that different
physicists at the time saw themselves required to point out differences be-
tween Einstein’s theory of relativity and Minkowski’s theory. One of them
was Einstein himself, who published a paper, together with Laub, in which
they argue that Minkowski’s electromagnetic treatment of the ponderomotive
force exercised on a moving body is in conflict with what they call electron
theory (1908b, p. 541).62 Another scientists drawing such a distinction was
Abraham, who in (1909) pointed out that Minkowksi’s framework differed
from Einstein’s and Planck’s with regards to the issue of whether bodies have
a constant or a variable rest mass, a claim he repeated in Italian in (1910).
62Lewis Pyenson (1985, p. 81 – 82) offers a short discussion of Einstein’s work with Laub
on Minkowski.
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3.3. Minkowski and Laue’s Normative Interpretation
The Minkowskian Universalization of Relativity. The central aim of Minkowski’s
work on relativity, as he states it in his first presentation on the topic to
the Go¨ttinger Mathematischen Gesellschaft (1907), is to show how the the-
ory offers mathematicians the opportunity to contribute to actual physical
research. The theory allows for this, according to Minkowski, because it
entails that the physical world is a well-known mathematical object: a four-
dimensional non-euclidean manifold, an object with which mathematicians
already have quite some experience (1907, p. 927).
In his well-known Grundgleichungen article (1908),63 Minkowski then
elaborates the specifics of this mathematical-physical program. In order to
do this, Minkowski first introduces a three-fold distinction between the the-
orem, the postulate and the principle of relativity. The theorem comes down
to the mathematical fact that the Maxwell equations are invariant under the
Lorentz-transformations. The postulate is the hypothesis that as-of-yet un-
known laws concerning material bodies will also display such a covariance
under the same transformations. The principle, finally, expresses the belief
that the introduced covariance will hold as a determinate relation between
observable quantifiable characteristics of moving bodies (Minkowski, 1908,
p. 54).
On the basis of this, Minkowski then proceeds as follows. In the first
section, he outlines his fundamental equations describing the electromagnetic
ether, void of any material systems, under the rule of the theorem of relativity.
63This is the only work by Minkowski on relativity that was published during his life.
He died of appendicitis in 1909.
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The second section is then concerned with the discussion of electromagnetic
processes in moving material systems. In order to discuss these, he introduces
three axioms: first, that a body at rest can be described by the laws of
electrostatics; second, that the speed with which light propagates through
empty space forms an upper limit on the motion of all physical systems;
and third, his principle of relativity, i.e. the claim that Lorentz covariance
holds as a determinate relation between observable quantities for moving
bodies (Minkowski, 1908, p. 72). On the basis of this, he then formulates his
fundamental equations for the electrodynamics of moving bodies.
The physico-mathematical framework he has developed on the basis of
these three axioms then allows him, more specifically, to employ the principle
of relativity as a normative instrument to evaluate electrodynamical theories,
which he showcases for the theories of Emil Cohn (1901) and Lorentz (1904).
What he does is to compare these theories’ fundamental equations with the
ones he has obtained for the electrodynamics of moving bodies. Given that
the Minkowskian equations are based on his three axioms, which are to ensure
the equations’ covariance with respect to the Lorentz transformations, they
do indeed offer a way to evaluate whether the equations of other theories
are also relativistic. In this way, it becomes clear how Minkowski sees the
participation of mathematicians in physical research.
Moreover, Minkowski does not confine the evaluatory normativity of the
principle of relativity merely to the electrodynamics of moving bodies. In
the appendix of his Grundgleichungen paper he turns to classical mechanics.
Many authors, he claims, consider this domain to be in contradiction with the
principle of relativity, a conflict that arises, according to Minkowski’s frame-
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work, from the fact that the equations of mechanics and the electrodynamic
equations are both covariant with respect to the expression−x2−y2−z2+c2t2,
but for different determinations of c: for mechanics, c =∞, whereas for elec-
trodynamics it is a finite, determinate quantity (1908, p. 99). However, this
situation can be overcome, according to Minkowski, if we follow his math-
ematical machinery, which tells us that we should reformulate the theory
of mechanics in terms of the principle of conservation of energy (1908, p.
108 – 109).64 We thus see how Minkowski’s principle of relativity functions
as an evaluative and normative constraint on the formulation of any physi-
cal theory, whether it be Lorentz’s or Cohn’s electrodynamics or Newtonian
mechanics.
This point marks one central difference between Minkowski’s and Ein-
stein’s approach to the theory of relativity. For Einstein, the principles of
the theory primarily functioned as a heuristic instrument: they primarily
served as a way to open up new areas of physical research. For Minkowski,
on the other hand, the principle served as a norm constraining the practice of
physical theorizing: any theory should conform to the principle of relativity,
and if a theory does not, the principle of relativity tells us how to change
64In the introduction to his article, Minkowski describes this as a very surprising con-
sequence (“einem sehr u¨berraschenden Erfolge”) of his theory (1908, p. 56). This seems
to suggest that Minkowski’s aim was to present his theory as something more than just a
mathematical reformulation of relativity theory, because it led to new insights. In a sense,
this claim of originality by Minkowski here is a bit surprising and quite unfair, because in
his (1907) lecture he had also hinted at this consequence, but there he admitted that it
was first presented by Planck (1908a).
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it.65 This becomes especially clear in the lecture Minkowski presented to the
Naturforscherversammlung, titled Raum und Zeit (1909), in which he elab-
orates the physical content of his interpretation of the theory of relativity.
The theory’s central claim, according to Minkowski, is that the laws of nature
are invariant with respect to the transformation group GC , where c is the
velocity of light, rather than with respect to the transformation group G∞
of Newtonian mechanics, where c = ∞. Expressed in different terms, this
comes down to the claim that the collection of admissible reference systems
is constrained by the GC-invariance of the laws of physics: one can transform
the reference system employed by means of the group GC without thereby
changing the form of the laws of physics (Minkowski, 1909, p. 78).
What the mathematical formalism of the transformation group GC cap-
tures is that our three-dimensional reference frames for space and time are
constructed by us within four-dimensional space-time. In this way, the for-
malism shows, according to Minkowski, that the principle of relativity goes
further than Einstein thought: Einstein only relativized time, and it took the
boldness of mathematical culture (“Verwegenheit mathematischer Kultur”)
65This is not to say that Einstein’s use of the principle was exclusively heuristic, while
Minkowski’s was exclusively normative, but rather that there is a difference in emphasis:
while Einstein also sometimes formulates the principles in normative terms, he primarily
employs them as heuristic instruments that guide the development of the theory; and while
for Minkowski the principles can also act as guides, he primarily uses them to evaluate
other theories. As will be discussed in section 4 in more detail, the most important
difference between the two approaches is not, however, that they use the principles as
either guides or constraints, but rather their different epistemological characterizations of
the principles.
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to see that both space in itself and time in itself, according to the principle,
had to be relegated to the shadows. For this reason, Minkowski proposes to
stop using the term ‘postulate of relativity’ to refer to the GC-invariance of
the laws of physics, since he finds it rather bland (“sehr matt”). Instead, he
proposes, we should speak about what he calls the ‘postulate of the abso-
lute world’, because it better expresses the true meaning of the postulate of
relativity:
Since the postulate comes to mean that spatio-temporal phenomena
manifest themselves only in terms of the four-dimensional world, but
the projection in space and time may still be performed with certain
liberty, I prefer to call it the postulate of the absolute world (or briefly,
the world-postulate). ((Minkowski, 1909, p. 82), translated in (Corry,
1997, p. 296 – 297))
And the central insight of what Minkowski calls the electromagnetic program
started by Lorentz and continued by Einstein is that this world-postulate
has exceptionless validity (“ausnahmslose Gu¨ltigkeit”) (1909, p. 88). This
indicates a significant difference with Einstein’s and Planck’s approach to
the theory of relativity: for them, the theory’s range of validity was still an
open question, which was to be decided on an experimental basis. Another
difference concerns the theory’s domain, and the way in which it was to be
applied. For Einstein, the principles only applied to rods, clocks and light
signals, and it could only be applied in a piece-meal way to specific cases,
since a relativistic world view was still lacking. Minkowski, on the other hand
universalizes the domain: the theory’s principles now apply to the observable
characteristics of all moving systems in general as they manifest themselves
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in the four-dimensional non-Euclidean manifold that is the world. In this
way, the theory’s principles come to function as norms for all present and
future theories: from now on, physical theories are only concerned with the
behavior of systems that can be described in terms of GC-invariant laws.
One particular consequence of this ascription of unlimited validity to the
postulate of the absolute world now is that it directly entails the dismissal of
any real challenge posed to the principle of relativity by the Kaufmann ex-
periments. For the universality of Minkowski’s postulate entails that it does
not make any sense, within a GC-invariant mechanics, to talk about a rigid
body, for in that case it would be possible to detect some kind of ether-drift
(1909, p. 80).66 In this way, the Minkowskian formalism thus rules out, by
means of its universalization of the principle of relativity, that the Kaufmann
experiments can pose a challenge to the principle, since the experiments were
precisely concerned with the issue of whether the electron was rigid or de-
formable. In fact, Minkowski’s move goes even further. Given that, on his
view, the postulate of the absolute world underlies any experience of space
and time, it follows that the postulate itself is not open for experimental in-
vestigation or testing in general: there does not seem to be any direct way to
test experimentally whether the actual world does indeed obey the postulate
of the absolute world.
This clearly shows that Minkowski’s approach to the theory of relativ-
66Ehrenfest (1909) made a similar claim: he showed in an intuitive way that, following
Minkowski’s ideas, the notion of a rigid body leads to two contradictory claims with regards
to a rotating cylinder. Miller (1981, p. 235 – 257) and Staley (2008, p. 284 – 291) offer a
broad overview of the discussions on the rigid body during this period.
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ity differs from Einstein’s. On Einstein’s view, as we have seen earlier (see
page 53), there was the possibility of experimental testing, not only of con-
sequences of the theory such as the formulae for the velocity-dependence of
the electron’s mass, but also of the theory’s physical core, i.e. its physical
interpretation of time in terms of the oscillating ions constituting canal rays.
The two approaches differ not only with regards to experiment, however,
but also concerning their historiography. For Planck and Einstein, as we
have seen (page 54), the theory of relativity primarily emerged out of issues
pertaining to radiation phenomena. For Minkowski, on the other hand, the
principle of relativity’s physical importance primarily emerged out of issues
regarding classical mechanics. For while he admits that it was the Maxwell
equations that led to the theorem of relativity – i.e. the mathematical fact
that the laws of electrodynamics are Lorentz invariant –, the real physical sig-
nificance is that this new invariance-conception leads us to the insight that
the equations of mechanics are only approximations of reality (Minkowski
(1907, p. 935); Minkowski (1908, p. 99); Minkowski (1909, p. 78)), since it is
this insight that leads Minkowski to his postulate of the absolute world and
its reconceptualization of space and time.
In this way, it becomes clear how the Minkowskian normative approach to
the theory of relativity differs from the Einsteinian heuristic approach. For
Minkoski, the postulate of the absolute world applies to the observable char-
acteristics of all moving systems within the non-Euclidean four-dimensional
manifold that is the world, which entails the following: it functions as a norm
for the formulation and evaluation of all physical theories; it is prior to any
possible physical experiment; it therefore has exceptionless validity; and it
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emerged out of issues pertaining to mechanical phenomena. For Einstein, on
the other hand, the theory of relativity applies to the physical behaviour of
rigid rods, clocks and light signals, which entails the following: it serves as a
heuristic tool in the investigation of new domains, and has to be applied in
a piece-meal way; it can be tested experimentally; the range of its validity is
therefore still an open question; and it emerged out of issues pertaining to
radiation phenomena.
Laue replies to Ehrenfest. That Minkowski’s universalization of the principle
of relativity dismisses, by means of a priori postulation, the challenge posed
by the Kaufmann experiments, shows itself in a subtle way in Laue’s (1911a)
article. According to Janssen (2009, p. 35), this work clearly showed the
kinematical nature of the velocity-dependence of mass (see page 18). Laue
starts his article by pointing out that, on the assumption that Newtonian
dynamics forms a limiting case for infinitely low velocities, Einstein (1905a)
and Planck (1906a) already sorted out the relativistic dynamics of the mass
point. On this basis, they then obtained the equations for the velocity-
dependence of longitudinal and transverse mass, now confirmed by several
unnamed electron-experiments. At the same time, however, there are still
unresolved dynamical issues, one of which was raised by Ehrenfest (1907).
This issue, according to Laue, concerned the question of whether this dy-
namics of the mass-point also holds, when one conceives of the form of the
deformable electron not in terms of radial symmetry, as one normally does,
but rather as a kind of ellipsoidal form (Laue, 1911a, p. 524).
Einstein (1907a), according to Laue, already responded to Ehrenfest’s
question in the affirmative. Given that this response lacked in generality,
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Laue returns to the issue, but he proposes to proceed, however, in the oppo-
site direction. While Einstein and Planck started with the dynamics of the
mass point, Laue, on the other hand, will start from his relativistic contin-
uum dynamics, firmly based within the Minkowskian framework, as is clear
from the formulation of the principle of relativity he presents in his (1911b):67
The principle of relativity claims: through ever increasing approxima-
tions one can determine, out of the the totality of natural phenomena,
ever more precisely a reference system x, y, z, t, in which the laws of
nature hold in a precise and mathematically simple form. This refer-
ence system is not, however, precisely set by the phenomena. There
rather is a threefold infinite variety of equal systems, which move
with uniform velocities with respect to each other. (Laue, 1911b, p.
33; personal translation)
Proceeding in this way then allows Laue to show how one can obtain equa-
tions for the rest mass of a completely static system and for the longitudinal
and transverse mass of such a system undergoing quasi-stationary accelera-
tion, independent of the system’s precise form (1911a, p. 539 – 541).68 Laue
then states that the electron with its field forms such a system, which leads
67Laue’s (1911b) was, as Staley put it, “[t]he first and authoritative textbook on rel-
ativity” (2008, p. 334). There he gives two reasons for starting with a dynamics of the
continuum, instead of a dynamics of the mass point: because otherwise it would not
be possible to account for Ehrenfest’s question and the Trouton-Noble experiment (see
Janssen (2009, p. 41 – 47) for a discussion of this experiment and Laue’s work on it); and
because it would require more hypotheses than strictly needed (Laue, 1911b, p. 148).
68A completely static system, on Laue’s account, is a system that, in its rest frame,
is in static equilibrium, without interacting with other bodies (1911a, p. 539). A sys-
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him to the claim that whatever its form, it must conform to the dynamics
of the mass point when it is undergoing quasi-stationary acceleration. As
such, it is not possible, on the basis of these results, to investigate further
into the electron’s form, its charge-distribution, or the question of whether
the electron’s constitution is purely electromagnetic, and Einstein therefore
responded correctly to Ehrenfest’s question (Laue, 1911a, p. 541 – 542).
In this way, it becomes clear that Laue’s response does not completely
provide a satisfying answer to Ehrenfest’s question, since they are in fact
concerned with different kinds of questions. For Laue, the central issue was
whether the dynamics of Einstein’s mass point electron would remain the
same if one ascribed a different form to the electron. This was not, however,
Ehrenfest’s central concern: for him, the question was not about the specific
form of the deformable electron, but rather the stability of a deformable
electron in general. Both Ehrenfest’s paper and Kaufmann’s experiments
essentially concerned the question of whether the electron is rigid (Abraham)
or deformable (Lorentz-Einstein, Bucherer). Ehrenfest is quite explicit about
this: in the statement of his question, he points out that the issue arrises
independently of the precise form of the deformable electron, by referring to
a claim made by Planck (1906a, p. 137) (see page 24). This is also clear from
the fact that he raises the same issue for Bucherer’s deformable electron:
tem undergoing quasi-stationary acceleration is a system that is characterized by such an
acceleration that what he calls its inner state (“innere Zustand”), characterized by the
system’s rest energy E0 and its stress tensor p0, does not change noticeably (Laue, 1911a,
p. 541). The motion of the electrons in Kaufmann’s experiments was shown by Abraham
(1903, p. 159) to be quasi-stationary.
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while it is clear, he claims there, how Abraham’s rigid electron is stable,
this is not the case for the deformable electron (Ehrenfest, 1906, p. 302).
Moreover, Einstein also read the issue in these terms, as is clear from his
response to Ehrenfest: there he points out that while the stability issue is
easily solvable if one postulates the electron as a rigid body, a relativistic
account of this is not available yet, since a dynamics of the rigid body is still
lacking (1907a, p. 208). Einstein’s claim there was not that the form of the
deformable electron does not matter, but rather that the dynamics of such
an electron is still an open question from a relativistic point of view, and
one that he took to be important, it seems, given his work on the electron’s
constitution in his (1909a).
As such, Laue’s (1911a) article should not be read as providing an actual
answer to Ehrenfest’s question. It only shows that, assuming the Minkowskian
principle of relativity, we can obtain the relativistic equations for the velocity-
dependence of mass, regardless of what precise form we ascribe to the elec-
tron. What it does not show, however, is that the electron is in fact de-
formable rather than rigid. Laue’s treatment of the issue rather makes clear
that Ehrenfest’s original concern, whether a deformable electron can actually
be stable in comparison with a rigid body, does not make much sense any-
more: the only question that remains is whether the form ascribed to the de-
formable electron makes a difference. If we therefore want to claim that Laue
put aside the electromagnetic challenge raised by Kaufmann’s experiments
and Ehrenfest’s question, then we have to recognize that that is not because
he established the purely kinematical nature of the velocity-dependence of
mass, but rather because the Minkowskian framework excludes, by means of
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its a priori universalization of the principle of relativity, the possibility of a
relativistic rigid body.
We should therefore not read Laue’s results as some kind of relativis-
tic refutation of the electromagnetic program. Laue himself also did not
see his work in this way, as is clear from the way he treats, for example,
the dynamics of the electron (conceived in turn as a mass point, a charged
sphere, an elastic body and as a completely static system) in his handbook
(1911b, p. 162 – 170). He there points out that, while the principle of rela-
tivity is in agreement with experiments by Bucherer and Karl Erich Hupka
on the velocity-dependence of mass, it is not yet completely without objec-
tions (“einwandfrei”).69 He then turns to a short discussion of the attempts
to formulate a completely electromagnetic conception of the electron, after
which he points out that, according to him, the principle of relativity seems
to fare better than them: for while such conceptions are committed to a
purely electromagnetic mass in order to account for the velocity-dependence
of mass, relativity leaves room for many different possible conceptions of
mass (Laue, 1911b, p. 167).70 As such, Laue indicates, a choice between the
69Bucherer (1908) and Hupka (1909; 1910) both ran experiments on the velocity-
dependence of the electron’s mass with experimental set-ups that attempted to improve
on Kaufmann’s. Laue presents both experiments as providing results in favor of the the-
ory of relativity. In both cases, however, there were severe criticisms: for a discussion of
Bucherer’s experiments and Adolf Bestelmeyer’s criticism, see Miller (1981, p. 345 – 350)
and Staley (2008, p. 250 – 254); for the experiments carried out by Hupka and criticized
by Wilhelm Heil (both doctoral students of Planck), see Miller (1981, p. 376 – 377; note
9) and Pyenson (1985, p. 202 – 203).
70This claim in itself already constitutes a very interesting turn in the debate, since the
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two approaches with respect to this particular issue is still a real possibility,
since the experiments carried out until now cannot decide for us.
In his concluding remarks, Laue then elaborates how he sees the more
general relationship between the principle of relativity and the electromag-
netic program. Here, the issue is not even one of a choice between the two.
Rather, the electromagnetic program and the principle of relativity here con-
cern two completely separate issues. According to Laue, the question of
whether we should take the fact that all physical forces lead to behavior that
is Lorentz invariant as an argument for a common, electromagnetic, origin, is
one that is completely outside the concerns of the relativistic approach. The
only thing we can conclude from this fact, Laue claims, is that the principle
of relativity holds for any domain of physics, which leads him to character-
ize it as a criterion of admissibility for any physical theory (1911b, p. 185
– 186). As such, we see how Laue follows Minkowski in characterizing the
principle of relativity as a normative constraint on the practice of physics,
and that it is this that allows him to dismiss Kaufmann’s experiments and
Ehrenfest’s question as a serious challenge to the principle of relativity, and
to characterize the electromagnetic program as a completely detached issue.
In this way, the Minkowskian framework in which Laue formulates his rela-
tivistic continuum dynamics does not so much allow him to definitely refute
fact that the theory of relativity did not provide a definite answer regarding the precise
constitution of the electron was only a few years earlier taken as a big problem for the
theory (see the discussion of Ehrenfest’s paper in section 3.1, as well as Staley’s discussion
of challenges posed by the theory of the electron to the principle of relativity (2008, p. 260
– 293)).
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the challenges raised by the electromagnetic program, but rather to put them
aside as issues that are no longer pressing, since they are outside the concerns
of the relativistic approach. This also shows the difference with Einstein’s
approach to relativity at the time, since he attempted, in his (1909a) work,
to incorporate Ehrenfest’s issue within the relativistic research program (see
page 52).
4. Concluding Remarks
In the previous section I have shown that the historical narrative about
Kaufmann’s experiments underlying Janssen’s (2009) philosophical claim
that the theory of relativity establishes that the velocity-dependence of mass
is a kinematical phenomenon about which nothing more can be learned, and
that dynamical studies were therefore illusory and misguided, does not hold
op against the historical development of the theory of relativity. My con-
cern is thus not primarily with Janssen’s philosophical claim about how to
interpret the special theory of relativity, but rather with the three particular
historical claims on which Janssen based his argument for this philosophical
claim: (i) that Einstein’s (1905a) derivation of the relativistic formulas for
the velocity-dependence of the electron’s longitudinal and transverse mass
showed that he saw that the phenomenon is purely kinematical; (ii) that the
acceptance of these formulas was mainly a result of theoretical considerations,
and that experimental considerations played no real role of importance; and
(iii) that the Minkowskian framework provides the natural interpretation of
the theory of relativity, and that within this framework the kinematical na-
ture of the phenomenon becomes especially clear, as Laue’s (1911a) shows.
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In this concluding section, I will start with a discussion of these three claims,
which will lead me to my claim that historically speaking, we can distinguish
between a heuristic and a normative approach to the theory of special rel-
ativity. Given that Janssen explicitly states that his philosophy of physics
is informed by the history of physics, I will then reflect a bit about what
this could mean for Janssen’s general philosophical claim that the theory of
special relativity reveals the kinematical nature of phenomena such as the
velocity-dependence of mass.
With regards to claim (i), sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 have shown that dy-
namical considerations did play an important role in the development of a
relativistic response to the issues raised by Kaufmann’s experiments. It has
been shown, more specifically, that Einstein took Ehrenfest’s challenge to
pose an actual issue for the theory of relativity, and that it urged him to
investigate the implications of the principles of the theory of relativity for a
dynamics of the rigid body. We have also seen that it was Planck’s elabo-
ration of a general dynamics, on the basis of his study of the dynamics of
the black-body, that led to a relativistic account of the velocity-dependence
of mass as a phenomenon of merely secondary importance. Finally, we have
also seen that Einstein was actively searching for a response to Ehrenfest’s
question regarding the electron’s constitution, through his work on radiation
phenomena and the quantum-hypothesis. As such, it is not the case that Ein-
stein (or Planck) considered the issues surrounding the velocity-dependence
of mass to be merely kinematical in nature, or that they believed that a rela-
tivistic study of them would be independent of any dynamical considerations
of the systems displaying such behaviour.
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Concerning claim (ii), it has turned out that experimental considerations
did play an important role in the elaboration and establishment of the theory
of relativity. We have seen, for example, that radiation phenomena, for Ein-
stein, provided a way to experimentally test and elaborate both the central
principles and the particular consequences of the theory. In the case of Planck
as well, experimental considerations played an important role: it is only be-
cause of his thorough analysis of both the material and conceptual machinery
of Kaufmann’s experimental set-up that he was able to argue that the experi-
mental results should not be taken as a definitive refutation of the principle of
relativity. Moreover, many other early adherents of the relativistic approach
also engaged quite profoundly with the experimental aspects of both Kauf-
mann’s experiments and their implications for the theory of relativity: both
Planck and Stark, for example, participated in a thorough exchange with
Kaufmann about Kaufmann’s material set-up and the validity of Planck’s
analysis;71 Bucherer (1908) and Hupka (1909; 1910) both performed exper-
iments on the velocity-dependence of the electron’s mass, which improved
on particular aspects of Kaufmann’s experiments; and Laub not only pro-
posed, together with Einstein, a way to distinguish experimentally between
71Kaufmann (1907) discussed some particular aspects of Planck’s analysis, to which
both Planck (1907) and Stark (1908) responded, which in turn solicited a response by
Kaufmann (1908). This discussion concerned the question of whether any residual gas in
Kaufmann’s experimental set-up could have been ionized by the radiation passing through
it, which would influence the effective strength of the electric field applied, and which would
thus have an influence on the exact deflection of the electrons constituting the radiation
(Staley, 2008, p. 249 – 250).
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Lorentz’s electrodynamics and the theory of relativity (1908a), but he also
published an extensive review article on the experimental foundations of the
principle of relativity (1910). As such, this indicates that experimental con-
siderations did play an important role, both regarding the particular issue
of the velocity-dependence of mass and the more general elaboration of the
theory of relativity. Moreover, it has become clear that the development of
a relativistic response was not solely an issue of either theory or experiment,
but equally well of historiography: it was through the integration of certain
aspects of the electromagnetic program and of the study of radiation phe-
nomena into a historical progression towards the theory of relativity that the
theory could be presented as actually overcoming the issues and challenges
raised by the electromagnetic program.
In this way, we immediately come to see that claim (iii) is problematic
as well, since with regards to these issues – theory, experiment, and histo-
riography – a significant distinction can be drawn between Einstein’s and
Minkowski’s approach to the principle of relativity and the light principle.
Einstein, at the time, took the principles of the theory of relativity primar-
ily to function as a heuristic instrument, which in itself only made claims
about rods, clocks, and light signals. In order to arrive at further claims,
the principles had to be applied to the laws of physics, and this could re-
sult in new insights that could then be investigated further by other means.
One particular aspect of this interpretation was that, because of Einstein’s
physical interpretation of the theory in terms of rods and clocks, not only
the consequences of the application of the principles but also the principles
itself were open to experimental investigation (see page 53). As such, the
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theory of relativity was, for Einstein, to be elaborated by means of both
theoretical and experimental considerations, and this especially with regards
to radiation phenomena. This preference for radiation phenomena seems to
have had two reasons: first, because they embody a central aim of the theory
of relativity, i.e. to bring together all kinds of laws of physics under a few
guiding principles; and second, because they offered an essential object of
study for the construction of an all-encompassing relativistic view of nature,
since they showed the limitations of the Maxwell equations. As such, we also
come to see why the theory of relativity, according to Einstein (1909a), had
its historical origins in the study of radiation phenomena. That the prin-
ciples of the theory, on this heuristic approach, were open to experimental
investigation and testing also entailed that their range of validity was still
an open question: as Einstein points out, for example, in his (1907c, p. 439)
review article, experiments could lead to the conclusion that the principle
of relativity does not completely agree with the facts.72 Finally, this also
entailed that the theory of relativity had to be elaborated in a piecemeal
way, as is clear from Einstein’s remarks, in his (1907b) article, on the lack
of a relativistic world view: this entailed that, at the time, the only way to
elaborate the theory was by means of specific electrodynamical cases, since
only there were the principles of the theory on secure ground.
For Minkowski, on the other hand, the principle primarily functions as a
72A similar view was held, according to Goldberg (1976, p. 136), by Kurd von Mosengeil,
a student of Planck on whose work Planck based his relativistic dynamics (1908a): “[a]s far
as the validity of the principle of relativity was concerned, that was still an open question”
for Mosengeil.
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universal norm on the formulation of any physical theory, since it applies to
the observable characteristics of any moving body: as Laue puts it, the prin-
ciple acts as a criterion of admissibility for any physical theory (1911b, p. 185
– 186). The most important consequence of this conceptualization, accord-
ing to Minkowski, is the relativization of both space and time, which become
constructs of our making within the four-dimensional non-Euclidean mani-
fold that is the physical world. This entails first, that the principle’s validity
becomes exceptionless, and second, that the principle is not open for exper-
imental testing, since it precedes any possible physical experience. As such,
the theory of relativity was to be elaborated, on Minkowski’s view, primar-
ily through the mathematical means offered by Minkowski’s four-dimensional
space-time geometry. The main reason for this mathematization of the theory
of relativity seems to have been Minkowski’s aim to show that mathemati-
cians could contribute to the elaboration of fundamental physics: it puts
them in a position to elaborate and evaluate other theories (such as Cohn’s
and Lorentz’s, as we have seen on page 62), and in this way it provides
evidence for what Minkowski calls a pre-established harmony between pure
mathematics and physics (“eine pra¨stabilierte Harmonie zwischen der reinen
Mathematik und der Physik”) (1909, p. 88).73 As such, we also come to
see why Minkowski elaborated the real physical importance of the theory of
relativity through its historical relation with Newtonian classical mechanics:
showing how the group G∞ is an approximation of GC allows Minkowski
to present his four-dimensional space-time geometry as embodying the new
73For a historical discussion of this concept of a pre-established harmony, see Pyenson’s
chapter 6 on this topic (1985, p. 137 – 157).
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kinematical basis for any physical theory and as replacing the Newtonian
concepts of space and time.
These three points now allow me to address both Janssen’s treatment
of the Kaufmann episode in particular, and his philosophical claim that the
theory of relativity shows the kinematical nature of relativistic phenomena in
general. Let us first turn to the Kaufmann episode. We have seen that both
Planck and Einstein attempted, on the basis of dynamical considerations
pertaining to radiation phenomena, to develop a relativistic response to the
issues raised by Kaufmann’s experiments and Ehrenfest’s paper. Planck’s
general dynamics, based on his study of black-body radiation, entailed that
the velocity-dependence of mass is primarily an issue of definition from a
relativistic point of view. And Einstein’s work on the constitution of ra-
diation led him to an outline for a relativistic theory that would account
for the structure of both the electron and the quantum. As such, we see
how the heuristic approach to the theory of relativity allowed for the possi-
bility of elaborating a direct answer to the issues raised by Kaufmann and
Ehrenfest: it is by the piecemeal application of the principles of the theory
to the laws of physics that govern specific cases that additional statements
can be derived, which are then to be investigated further by turning to the
dynamics underlying those specific cases. On the normative approach to the
theory, as we have seen in our discussion of Minkowski and Laue, this was
not possible, since Minkowski’s universalization of the principles entailed the
exclusion of a relativistic study of the dynamics of the electron. On the ba-
sis of this, Laue then sidesteps the actual question raised by Ehrenfest, by
showing that the precise form of the deformable electron does not make a
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difference, rather than actually addressing the issue of whether the electron
is rigid or deformable. As such, we see that the Kaufmann episode does not
provide historical evidence for Janssen’s claim that the theory of relativity
established the kinematical nature of the velocity-dependence of mass. The
discussion rather showed that, on the heuristic approach, the development
of a relativistic account of the velocity-dependence of mass was closely in-
tertwined with reflections on the dynamics of particular systems displaying
such behaviour, such as radiation and the electron. On the normative ap-
proach, on the other hand, we see that these dynamical issues are no longer
of concern for the relativistic program.
In this way, we arrive at Janssen’s general philosophical claim, that spe-
cial relativity establishes the kinematical nature of relativistic phenomena,
and that this becomes especially clear in its Minkowskian formulation, which
forms the theory’s natural interpretation. What the discussion above shows
is that it is difficult, historically speaking, to talk about the natural interpre-
tation of the theory. A first thing to notice is that the historical discussion
indicates that it is difficult to speak of the theory of relativity at the time.
We are rather dealing with different approaches to relativistic physics, each
with their preferred objects of study, their particular ways of elaborating the
theory, and their own historiography: on the heuristic approach, the elabo-
ration of the theory proceeded in a piecemeal way by means of theoretical
and experimental considerations pertaining to specific cases such as radiation
phenomena, which entailed that the range of validity of the theory’s princi-
ples was still an open question; on the normative approach, the elaboration
of the theory proceeded through the mathematical study of four-dimensional
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non-Euclidean geometry, which entailed the exceptionless validity of the the-
ory’s principles. And the choice for a particular approach, it seems, was
primarily made on the basis of what one took to be the central aim of the
principle of relativity: for Planck and Einstein, it was to bring together all
kinds of laws of physics, whereas for Minkowski it was to show that pure
mathematics could contribute to fundamental physics.
As such, it is difficult to speak about the theory of relativity showing
that certain phenomena have a particular nature, be it kinematical or dy-
namical. Instead, the nature of a particular phenomenon under study seems
to depend on the approach employed to study it: on the heuristic approach,
the velocity-dependence of mass was ultimately taken to be a phenomenon
that had to be studied both kinematically and dynamically; on the norma-
tive approach, on the other hand, only the phenomenon’s kinematics could
be studied from a relativistic perspective. This suggests that phenomena
of scientific interest do not have a particular nature which is described by
a theory’s natural interpretation. Instead, what a particular scientist takes
to be a phenomenon’s nature depends on his or her particular aims and in-
terests, and a phenomenon’s nature is therefore itself an issue of scientific
debate and dispute, which shows itself in the way in which scientists charac-
terize the theoretical, experimental and historiographical manifestations of
the phenomenon. This does not mean that there are no phenomena, but
rather that there are always different ways to approach a phenomenon, i.e.
to turn it into a particular scientific object of study.74
74Because of this, I have not phrased my discussion of Einstein, Planck, Minkowski and
von Laue in terms of the dynamics vs. kinematics distinction. Especially the heuristic
82
Abraham, M. (1902). Dynamik des Elektrons. Nachrichten von
der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go¨ttingen, Mathematisch-
Physikalische Klasse: 20 – 41.
Abraham, M. (1903). Prinzipien der Dynamik des Elektrons. Annalen der
Physik, 10 : 105 – 179.
Abraham, M. (1904). Die Grundhypothesen der Elektronentheorie.
Physikalische Zeitschrift, 18 : 576 – 579.
Abraham, M. (1905). Theorie der Elektrizita¨t. Zweiter Band: Elektromag-
netischer Theorie der Strahlung. Teubner.
Abraham, M. (1909). Zur elektromagnetischen Mechanik. Physikalische
Zeitschrift, 21 : 737 – 741.
Abraham, M. (1910). Sull’Elletrodinamica di Minkowski. Rendiconti del Cir-
colo Matematico di Palermo, 30 : 33 – 46.
approach does not seem to fit into the category of either kinematical or dynamical, since
it seems to investigate the relativistic phenomena from both sides: while the theory, on the
heuristic approach, is tied to particular systems (rods, clocks, . . . ), this at the same time
allows for the investigation of the physical implications of the application of the theory’s
principles to new domains, such as Einstein (1905a) does for the electromagnetic field
and Planck (1908a) for thermal radiation. A second reason for choosing the heuristics
vs. normativity distinction over the dynamics vs. kinematics distinction is that using the
second would suggest that my primary aim would be to pick a position in the existing
debate within the philosophy of physics on the explanatory power of special relativity,
whereas my concern is more with the history underlying the debate.
83
Brown, H. (2005). Physical Relativity: Space-time structure from a dynamical
perspective. Oxford University Press.
Bucherer, A. (1904). Mathematische Einfu¨hrung in die Elektronentheorie.
Teubner.
Bucherer, A. (1908). Messungen an Becquerelstrahlen. Die experimentelle
Besta¨tigung der Lorentz-Einsteinschen Theorie. Physikalische Zeitschrift,
9 (22): 755 – 762.
Cohn, E. (1901). U¨ber die Gleichungen des Elektromagnetischen Feldes fu¨r
bewegte Ko¨rper. Annalen der Physik, 1 : 29 – 56.
Corry, L. (1997). Hermann Minkowski and the Postulate of Relativity.
Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 51 (4): 273 – 314.
Cushing, J. T. (1981). Electromagnetic mass, relativity, and the Kaufmann
experiments. American Journal of Physics, 49 : 1133 – 1149.
Darrigol, O. (2001). The Historians’ Disagreement over the Meaning of
Planck’s Quantum. Centaurus, 43 : 219 – 239.
Ehrenfest, P. (1905). U¨ber die physikalischen Voraussetzung der Planck’schen
Theorie der irreversiblen Strahlungsvorga¨nge. Sitzungsberichte der
Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien, Mathematisch-
Naturwissenschaftliche Klasse, 114 : 1301 – 1314.
Ehrenfest, P. (1906). Zur Stabilita¨tsfrage bei den Bucherer-Langevin-
Elektronen. Physikalische Zeitschrift, 7 : 302 – 303.
84
Ehrenfest, P. (1907). Die Translation deformierbarer Elektronen und der
Fla¨chensatz. Annalen der Physik, 23 : 204 – 205.
Ehrenfest, P. (1909). Gleichfo¨rmige Rotation starrer Ko¨rper und Rela-
tivita¨tstheorie. Physikalische Zeitschrift, 10 : 918.
Einstein, A. (1905a). Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Ko¨rper. Annalen der
Physik, 17 : 891 – 921.
Einstein, A. (1905b). Ist die Tra¨gheit eines Ko¨rpers von seinem Energieinhalt
abha¨ngig? Annalen der Physik, 18 : 639 – 641.
Einstein, A. (1905c). U¨ber einen die Erzeugung und Verwandlung des Lichtes
betreffenden heuristischen Gesichtspunkt. Annalen der Physik, 17 : 132 –
148.
Einstein, A. (1906a). Das Prinzip von der Erhaltung des Schwerpunktsbewe-
gung und die Tra¨gheit der Energie. Annalen der Physik, 20 : 627 – 633.
Einstein, A. (1906b). Zur Theorie der Lichterzeugung und Lichtabsorption.
Annalen der Physik, 20 : 199 – 206.
Einstein, A. (1906c). U¨ber eine Methode zur Bestimmung des Verha¨ltnisses
der transversalen und longitudinalen Masse des Elektrons. Annalen der
Physik, 21 : 583 – 586.
Einstein, A. (1907a). Bemerkungen zu der Notiz von Hrn. Paul Ehrenfest:
“Die Translation deformierbarer Elektronen und der Fla¨chensatz”. An-
nalen der Physik, 23 : 206 – 208.
85
Einstein, A. (1907b). U¨ber die vom Relativita¨tsprinzip geforderte Tra¨gheit
der Energie. Annalen der Physik, 23 : 371 – 384.
Einstein, A. (1907c). U¨ber das Relativita¨tsprinzip und die aus demselben
gezogenen Folgerungen. Jahrbuch der Radioaktivita¨t und Elektronik, 4 : 411
– 462.
Einstein, A. (1907d). Die Plancksche Theorie der Strahlung und die Theorie
der spezifischen Wa¨rme. Annalen der Physik, 22 : 180 – 190.
Einstein, A. (1907e). U¨ber die Mo¨glichkeit einer neuen Pru¨fung des Rela-
tivita¨tsprinzip. Annalen der Physik, 23 : 197 – 198.
Einstein, A. (1907f). U¨ber die Gu¨ltigkeitsgrenze des Satzes vom thermody-
namischen Gleichgewicht und u¨ber die Mo¨glichkeit einer neuen Bestim-
mung der Elementarquanta. Annalen der Physik, 22 : 596 – 572.
Einstein, A. & Laub, J. (1908a). U¨ber die elektromagnetische Grundgleichun-
gen fu¨r bewegte Ko¨rper. Annalen der Physik, 26 : 532 – 540.
Einstein, A. & Laub, J. (1908b). U¨ber die im elektromagnetischen Felde
auf ruhende Ko¨rper ausgeu¨bten ponderomotorischen Kra¨fte. Annalen der
Physik, 26 : 541 – 550.
Einstein, A. (1909a). Zum gegenwa¨rtigen Stand des Strahlungsproblem.
Physikalische Zeitschrift, 10 : 185 – 193.
Einstein, A. (1909b). U¨ber die Entwicklung unserer Anschauungen u¨ber das
Wesen und die Konstitution der Strahlung. Physikalische Zeitschrift, 10 :
817 – 825.
86
Einstein, A. (1917). U¨ber die spezielle und allgemeine Relativita¨tstheorie.
Braunschweig.
Gearheart, C. (2002). Planck, the Quantum, and the Historians. Physics in
Perspective, 4 : 170 – 215.
Goldberg, S. (1970). The Abraham Theory of the Electron: The Symbiosis
of Experiment and Theory. Archive for history of exact sciences, 7 (1): 7
– 25.
Goldberg, S. (1976). Max Planck’s Philosophy of Nature and His Elabora-
tion of the Special Theory of Relativity. Historical Studies in the Physical
Sciences, 7 : 125 – 160.
Helmholtz, Hermann von. (1895). Ueber die physikalische Bedeutung des
Princips der kleinsten Wirkung. In: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen III :
203 – 248.
Hon, G. (1995). Is the Identification of an Experimental Error Contextually
Dependent? The Case of Kaufmann’s Experiments and its Varied Recep-
tion. In: Buchwald, J. Z. (Ed.): Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories
of Doing Physics : 170 – 223.
Hupka, K. E. (1909). Beitrag zur Kenntnis der tra¨gen Masse bewegter Elek-
tronen. Annalen der Physik, 31 : 169 – 204.
Hupka, K. E. (1910). Zur Frage der tra¨gen Masse bewegter Elektronen. An-
nalen der Physik, 33 : 400 – 402.
87
Jammer, M. (1961). Concepts of Mass in classical and modern physics.
Harper Torchbooks.
Janssen, M. & Mecklenburg, M. (2006). From classical to relativistic mechan-
ics: electromagnetic models of the electron. In Hendricks, V. F. Jørgensen,
K. F. Lu¨tzen, J. and Pedersen, S. A. (Eds.): Interactions: Mathematics,
Physics and Philosophy, 1860 – 1930 : 65 – 134.
Janssen, M. (2009). Drawing the Line between Kinematics and Dynamics in
Special Relativity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,
40 : 26 –52.
Jungnickel, C. & McCormmach, R. (1990). Intellectual Mastery of Nature:
Theoretical Physics from Ohm to Einstein. Volume 2 The Now Mighty
Theoretical Physics 1870 – 1925. The University of Chicago Press.
Katzir, S. (2005). On “the electromagnetic world-view”: A comment on an
article by Suman Seth. Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological
Sciences, 36 (1): 189 – 192.
Kaufmann, W. (1901a). Die magnetische und elektrische Ablenkbarkeit der
Becquerelstrahlen und die scheinbare Masse der Elektronen. Nachrichten
von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go¨ttingen, Mathematisch-
Physikalische Klasse: 143 – 155.
Kaufmann, W. (1901b). Die Entwicklung des Elektronenbegriffs. Physikalis-
che Zeitschrift, 3 : 9 – 15.
88
Kaufmann, W. (1902). U¨ber die elektromagnetische Masse des Elek-
trons. Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go¨ttingen,
Mathematisch-Physikalische Klasse: 291 – 296.
Kaufmann, W. (1903). U¨ber die “Elektromagnetische Masse” der Elektro-
nen. Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go¨ttingen,
Mathematisch-Physikalische Klasse: 90 – 103.
Kaufmann, W. (1906). U¨ber die Konstitution des Elektrons. Annalen der
Physik, 19 : 487 – 553.
Kaufmann, W. (1907). Bemerkungen zu Herrn Plancks: ‘Nachtrag zu
der Besprechung der Kaufmannschen Ablenkungsmessungen’. Deutsche
Physikalische Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen, 9 : 667 – 673.
Kaufmann, W. (1908). Erwiderung an Herrn Stark. Deutsche Physikalische
Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen, 10 : 91 – 95.
Klein, M. J. (1962). Max Planck and the Beginnings of the Quantum Theory.
Archive for the history of the exact sciences, 1 : 459 – 479.
Klein, M. J. (1979). Einstein and the Development of Quantum Physics. In:
French, A. (Ed.). Einstein: A Centenary Volume. Heinemann.
Klein, M. J. et al. (1993). The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Volume
5, The Swiss Years: Correspondence, 1902 – 1914. Princeton University
Press.
Kragh, H. (1999). Quantum Generations: A History of Physics in the Twen-
tieth Century. Princeton University Press.
89
Kuhn, T. S. (1978). Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity 1894
– 1912. Oxford University Press.
Laub, J. (1910). U¨ber die experimentellen Grundlagen des Rela-
tivita¨tsprinzip. Jahrbuch der Radioaktivita¨t und Elektronik, 7 : 405 – 463.
Laue, M. (1911a). Zur Dynamik der Relativita¨tstheorie. Annalen der Physik,
35 : 524 – 542.
Laue, M. (1911b). Das Relativita¨tsprinzip. Braunschweig.
Levi-Civita, T. (1907). Sur le mouvement de l’e´lectricite´ sans liaisons ni forces
exte´rieures. Acade´mie des sciences (Paris), Comptes Rendus, 145 : 417 –
420.
Lorentz, H. A. (1895). Versuch einer Theorie der electrischen und optischen
Erscheinungen in bewegten Ko¨rpern. Brill.
Lorentz, H. A. (1899). Simplified Theory of Electrical and Optical Phenom-
ena in Moving Systems. Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Am-
sterdam, Section of Sciences, Proceedings, 1 : 427 – 442.
Lorentz, H. A. (1904). Electromagnetic phenomena in a system moving with
any velocity smaller than that of light. English reprint of Koninklijke
Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Section of sciences, Pro-
ceedings, 6, in Einstein, A. et al. (1952). The Principle of Relativity : 11 –
34. Dover.
McCormmach, R. (1970). Einstein, Lorentz, and the Electron Theory. His-
torical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 2 : 41 – 87.
90
Miller, A. I. (1981). Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity: Emergence
(1905) and Early Interpretation (1905 – 1911). Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company.
Minkowski, H. (1907). Das Relativita¨tsprinzip. Annalen der Physik, [1915]
352 : 927 – 938.
Minkowski, H. (1908). Die Grundgleichungen fu¨r die elektromagnetischen
Vorga¨nge in bewegten Ko¨rpern. Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wis-
senschaften zu Go¨ttingen, Mathematisch-Physikalische Klasse: 53 – 111.
Minkowski, H. (1909). Raum und Zeit. Jahresberichte der Deutschen
Mathematiker-Vereinigung : 75 – 88.
Planck, M. (1901a). U¨ber das Gesetz der Energieverteilung im Normalspec-
trum. Annalen der Physik, 4 : 553 – 563.
Planck, M. (1901b). U¨ber die Elementarquanta der Materie und der Elek-
tricita¨t. Annalen der Physik, 4 : 564 – 566.
Planck, M. (1906a). Das Prinzip der Relativita¨t und die Grundgleichungen
der Mechanik. Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen, 8 : 136
– 141.
Planck, M. (1906b). Die Kaufmannschen Messungen der Ablenkbarkeit der
β-Strahlen in ihrer Bedeutung fu¨r die Dynamik der Elektron. Physikalische
Zeitschrift, 7 : 753 – 761.
Planck, M. (1907). Nachtrag zu der Besprechung der Kaufmannschen
91
Ablenkungsmessungen. Verhandlungen Deutsche Physikalische
Gesellschaft, 9 (14): 301 – 305.
Planck, M. (1908a). Zur Dynamik bewegter Systeme. Annalen der Physik,
26 : 1 – 34.
Planck, M. (1908b). Bemerkungen zum Prinzip der Aktion und Reaktion in
der allgemeinen Dynamik. Physikalische Zeitschrift, 9 (23): 828 – 830.
Poincare´, H. (1905). Sur la dynamique de l’e´lectron. Comptes Rendus de
l’Academie des Sciences, CXL: 567 – 580.
Poincare´, H. (1906). Sur la dynamique de l’e´lectron. Rendiconti del Circolo
Matematico di Palermo, 21 : 129 – 175.
Pyenson, L. (1985). The Young Einstein: The Advent of Relativity. Taylor &
Francis.
Searle, G. F. C. (1897). On the steady motion of an electrified ellipsoid.
Philosophical Magazine, 44 : 329 – 341.
Seth, S. (2004). Quantum theory and the electromagnetic world-view. His-
torical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 35 (1): 67 – 93.
Seth, S. (2005). Response to Shaul Katzir: “On the electromagnetic world-
view”. Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 36 (1):
193 – 196.
Seth, S. (2010). Crafting the Quantum: Arnold Sommerfeld and the Practice
of Theory, 1890 – 1926. University of Chicago Press.
92
Stachel, J. et al. (1989). The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Volume 2,
The Swiss Years: Writings, 1900 – 1909. Princeton University Press.
Stark, J. (1906). U¨ber die Lichtemission der Kanalstrahlen in Wasserstof.
Annalen der Physik, 21 : 401 – 456.
Stark, J. (1907). Beziehung des Doppler-Effektes bei Kanalstrahlen zur
Planckschen Strahlungstheorie. Physikalische Zeitschrift, 25 : 913 – 919.
Stark, J. (1908). Bemerkung zu Herrn Kaufmanns Antwort auf einen Ein-
wand von Herrn Planck. Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft, 10 : 14 –
16.
Staley, R. (2008). Einstein’s Generation: The Origins of the Relativity Rev-
olution. University of Chicago Press.
Wien, W. (1900). U¨ber die Mo¨glichkeit einer elektromagnetischen
Begru¨ndung der Mechanik. Annalen der Physik, 5 : 501 – 513.
Wilson, H. A. (1904). On the Electric Effect of Rotating a Dielectric in a
Magnetic Field. Royal Society of London, Philosophical Transactions A,
204 : 121 – 137.
Zahar, E. (1989). Einstein’s Revolution: A Study in Heuristic. Open Court
Publishing Company.
93
